*  Adverse selection financial definition of adverse selection
Definition of adverse selection in the Financial Dictionary - by Free online English dictionary and encyclopedia. What is adverse selection? Meaning of adverse selection as a finance term. What does adverse selection mean in finance?
*  Deductible or Co-Insurance: Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse Selection? - Zurich Open Repository and...
The standard solution to adverse selection is the separating equilibrium introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz. Usually, the Rothschild-Stiglitz argument is developed in a model that allows for two states of the world only. In this paper adverse selection is dis-cussed for continuous loss distributions. This gives rise to the new problem of finding the proper form of an insurance contract to impose partial insurance of the low risks. This paper contributes to the discussion on optimal insurance. It analyzes two basic forms of insurance contracts: A contract with a deductible and a contract imposing a positive co-insurance rate. Since high risks can always self-reveal themselves as high risks and buy the optimal insurance contract at high risks' premiums the Pareto-superior insurance contract is the one that leaves the low risks with higher expected utility ...
*  Adverse Selection in Private, Stand-Alone Drug Plans and Techniques to Reduce It - The Commonwealth Fund
The problem stems from adverse selection, whereby those who anticipate moderately high drug costs are more interested in purchasing drug coverage, particularly generous drug coverage, than those who anticipate low costs. Because future annual prescription drug costs generally are easier for an individual to calculate and predict than total health care spending, adverse selection is of greater concern for drug-only plans than for plans covering a broader range of health care services. Further, the risks associated with a stand-alone benefit cannot be spread across a range of categories (as is usually the case for health insurance); nor can health and drug costs be counterbalanced ...
*  Capital Accumulation and Uncertain Lifetimes with Adverse Selection
This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on private annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. However, a fully funded social security system with compulsory participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. Thus, since social security offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, consumers cannot completely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private annuity market. Using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes, we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social security ...
*  Strategies to Limit Risk Selection in the Medicare Program - The Commonwealth Fund
The mission of The Commonwealth Fund is to promote a high-performing health care system that achieves better access, improved quality, and greater efficiency, particularly for society's most vulnerable, including low-income people, the uninsured, minority Americans, young children, and elderly adults. ...
*  Adverse selection and non-take inference with coherent risk and response scoring | SpringerLink
The authors offer a mathematical model for adverse selection by individual borrowers based on preferences for offers and the default (Bad) or non-default (Good) status of booked accounts. We define th
*  'Consumer-Driven' Health Plans Join Insurance Mainstream, Become Essential To Big Insurers' Business Strategy - The...
BETHESDA, Md.-With an estimated enrollment of 1.5 million, health plans that allow consumers to customize their benefits and provider networks have become central to major insurers' business plans and could comprise 15-50 percent of the market in five years, according to a new Health Affairs Web exclusive. But the article warns that such "consumer-driven" health plans need to be watched closely to see if the added choices and greater emphasis on consumer spending disincentives appeal broadly to employees and enrollment grows; or if, as some predict, consumer-driven health plans split up risk pools and shift costs to sicker enrollees. If this happens, enrollment would level off. Authors Jon Gabel, Anthony Lo Sasso, and Thomas Rice define consumer-driven plans as those in which enrollees can designate their benefit package and providers, either through a tier mechanism or a customized package, and pay any cost beyond a fixed contribution by ...
*  Risk-adjusted Capitation in an Era of Personalized Medicine:... : Medical Care
In this issue of Medical Care, we have an article of import and timeliness to current conversations on "bending the health care cost curve."1 The study by Drs Ash and Ellis is also sure to generate controversy, a preview of which the peer-review process has already provided. I am very pleased that Medical Care has chosen not to shy away from the controversy but rather has embraced it thoughtfully by framing the topic with alternative perspectives. These are conveyed in the accompanying commentaries.2-4. Drs Ash and Ellis propose an approach for risk-adjusting capitation payments and performance awards to primary-care providers. As pointed out by the commentators, the proposed approach is a method and not the method for accomplishing the task. The commentators have 2 related issues. First, the approach of Drs Ash and Ellis involves population-based estimates of health care utilization. The concern here is that population-based estimates probably do not accommodate well, if at ...
*  Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies
In this essay, we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates. We begin by outlining some important but often misunderstood differences between two types of conceptual frameworks related to selection. The first, which we call the fixed contracts approach, takes insurance contract provisions as given and views selection as influencing only insurance prices in equilibrium. The second, the endogenous contracts approach, treats selection as also influencing the design of the contract itself, including the overall level of coverage and coverage for services that are differentially demanded by sicker consumers. After outlining the selection problems, we discuss four commonly employed policy instruments that affect the extent and impact of ...
*  Selection stories: Understanding movement across health plans
Downloadable (with restrictions)! This study assesses the factors influencing the movement of people across health plans. We distinguish three types of cost-related transitions: adverse selection, the movement of the less healthy to more generous plans; adverse retention, the tendency for people to stay where they are when they get sick; and aging in place, enrollees' inertia in plan choice, leading plans with older enrollees to increase in relative cost over time. Using data from the Group Insurance Commission in Massachusetts, we show that adverse selection and aging in place are both quantitatively important. Either can materially impact equilibrium enrollments, especially when premiums to enrollees reflect these costs.
*  U.S. official touts health insurance markets, lawmakers leery | Reuters
The Obama administration onThursday assured U.S. lawmakers that it is on track to enrollmillions of people in new state health insurance markets, but itquickly came under fire from Republicans and Democrats about howcostly the coverage may be.
*  Genetic Adverse Selection « Healthcare Economist
individuals who carry the [Huntington Disease] genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance…relatively limited increases in genetic information may threaten the viability of private long-term care insurance.". ...
*  Economic Growth and Longevity Risk with Adverse Selection
Downloadable! We study a closed economy featuring heterogeneous agents and exhibiting endogenous economic growth due to interfirm external effects. Individual agents differ in terms of their mortality profile. At birth, nature assigns a health status to each agent. Health type is private information and annuity firms can only observe an agent’s age. In the presence of longevity risk, agents want to annuitize their wealth conform the classic result by Yaari (1965). In the first-best case with perfect annuities, the market would feature a separating equilibrium (SE) in which each health type obtains an actuarially fair perfect insurance. In the SE all agents are savers throughout their lives. The informational asymmetry precludes the attainment of the first-best equilibrium, however, as healthy individuals have a strong incentive to misrepresent their type by claiming to be unhealthy. Using the equilibrium ...
*  Cycles in the IPO market
Downloadable (with restrictions)! We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs.
*  Using Cost Observation to Regulate Bureaucratic Firms
Downloadable! We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied - cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the optimal contract. In all cases, the output level increases with the bureaucratic bias. We find that the optimal contract is linear in cost (fixed payment plus partial cost-reimbursement). A stronger preference for high output reduces the tendency of the firm to announce a high cost (adverse selection), allowing a more powered incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the costs is reimbursed), which alleviates the problem of moral hazard.
*  Signing Distortions in Optimal Tax and other Adverse Selection Problems with Random Participation
Downloadable! We develop a methodology to sign output distortions in the random participation framework. We apply our method to monopoly nonlinear pricing problem, to the regulatory monopoly problem and mainly to the optimal income tax problem. In the latter framework, individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and their disutility of participation to the labor market. We derive a fairly mild condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be non negative everywhere, implying that in-work effort is distorted downwards. Numerical simulations for the U.S. confirm this property. Moreover, it is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with zero or negligible earnings.
*  Lirias: Near-infrared photometry of carbon stars
Near-infrared, JHKL, photometry of 239 Galactic C-rich variable stars is presented and discussed. From these and published data, the stars were classified as Mira or non-Mira variables, and amplitudes and pulsation periods, ranging from 222 to 948 d for the Miras, were determined for most of them. A comparison of the colour and period relations with those of similar stars in the Large Magellanic Cloud indicates minor differences, which may be the consequence of sample selection effects. Apparent bolometric magnitudes were determined by combining the mean JHKL fluxes with mid-infrared photometry from IRAS and MSX. Then, using the Mira period luminosity relation to set the absolute magnitudes, distances were determined - to greater accuracy than has hitherto been possible for this type of star. Bolometric corrections to the K magnitude were calculated and prescriptions derived for calculating these from various colours. Mass-loss rates were also calculated and compared to values in the ...
*  Quality control, modeling, and visualization of CRISPR screens with MAGeCK-VISPR | Genome Biology | Full Text
In two-condition comparisons, MAGeCK-MLE gives similar results with existing methods such as MAGeCK-RRA, RSA, and RIGER. All the algorithms identified genes that are commonly essential to different cell types [16], as well as known positively selected genes in PLX treated conditions in two melanoma datasets (Fig. 3; also see Section A and B of Additional file 1). In the leukemia dataset, two-condition comparison algorithms (like MAGeCK-RRA) identified genes that are differentially selected in two cell lines by a direct comparison of HL60 and KBM7 (Fig. 3a) [10]. However, not all of these genes are equally biologically interesting, as MAGeCK-MLE further distinguished them into two groups: genes having little effect in one (β scores close to zero) but strong selection effect in the other cell line (large absolute β scores), and genes having weak and opposite effects in two cell lines (Fig. 3c). The first group of genes are often more biologically interesting as they are cell type-specific ...
*  Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Germany.
Asymmetric information is an important phenomenon in insurance markets, but the empirical evidence on the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard is mixed. Because of its implications for pricing, contract design, and regulation, it is crucial to test for asymmetric information in specific insurance markets. In this article, we analyze a recent data set on automobile insurance in Germany, the largest such market in Europe. We present and compare a variety of statistical testing procedures. We find that the extent of asymmetric information depends on coverage levels and on the specific risks covered, which enhances the previous literature. Within the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006), we also test whether drivers have realistic expectations concerning their loss distribution, and we analyze the market structure. ...
*  Premiums unveiled for health overhaul plans | GazetteXtra
With new health insurance markets launching next week, the Obama administration is unveiling premiums and plan choices for 36 states where the federal government is taking the lead to cover uninsured residents.
*  Leukemia & Lymphoma Society | Donate Today!
LLS is the largest voluntary health organization dedicated to funding research, finding cures and ensuring access to treatments for blood cancer patients.
*  Leukemia & Lymphoma Society | Donate Today!
LLS is the largest voluntary health organization dedicated to funding research, finding cures and ensuring access to treatments for blood cancer patients.
*  Learn About Our Risk Adjustment Staffing Company - Hueman
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*  Find the Perfect Healthcare Job - Hueman Risk Adjustment Staffing
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