Public reaction to the portrayal of the tobacco industry in the film The Insider.
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OBJECTIVES: To assess public perceptions of the tobacco industry and behavioural intentions for tobacco use in response to watching the film The Insider. DESIGN: Self administered pre-film survey conducted immediately before viewing and post-film telephone survey conducted within 1-5 weeks of viewing. SETTING: Two commercial cinemas in Melbourne, Australia. SUBJECTS: 323 cinema patrons were recruited before screening of target films. 182 watched The Insider, 141 watched Erin Brockovich. INTERVENTIONS: Subjects watched one of two films: The Insider which featured information about unethical conduct by the tobacco industry and negative information about the health effects of smoking, or the "control" film Erin Brockovich which had an analogous plot without anti-tobacco content. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Pre-film questionnaire: assessed movie viewing habits, demographic characteristics, smoking status, attitudes towards the tobacco industry, intentions for smoking. Post-film questionnaire: assessed same attitudes and intentions plus questions on the film viewed and perceptions of smoking prevalence. RESULTS: 266 (82%) subjects completed the post-film survey. Attitudes toward the tobacco industry were unfavourable at baseline. Those who saw The Insider held more negative views of business conduct by the tobacco industry than those who saw Erin Brockovich, once pre-existing attitudes to the industry were controlled for. The Insider also appears to have promoted a short term reduction in intentions to smoke. CONCLUSIONS: Results of this study suggest that if people were recurrently exposed to anti-tobacco content in movies there is potential for a more substantial and lasting impact on attitudes toward the tobacco industry and smoking. (+info)
California as a model.
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One of every three persons who starts smoking falls ill and dies prematurely because he or she smoked. Smoking has been causally linked to heart disease, cancer, and respiratory diseases and continues to be the number one preventable cause of death in this country. To prevent these deaths and the incidence of these diseases, California's Tobacco Control Program was established in 1989 specifically to reduce tobacco use in the state. The strategy of the program is to "denormalize" tobacco. This strategy emphasizes three areas of programmatic activity: to counter pro-tobacco influences, to reduce exposure to environmental tobacco smoke, and to reduce access to tobacco products, with a focus on both social and commercial sources. A fourth priority area, cessation, is considered more of an outcome. California's Tobacco Control Program has touched the life of every Californian. Adult smoking prevalence in the state has gone from approximately 11% lower than the rest of the nation in 1988 to 20% lower in 1996. There are now approximately one million fewer smokers in California than would have been expected. Overall, per capita cigarette consumption has fallen by more than 50%. Seventy percent of adult smokers reported that they tried to quit in the last year. Exposure to secondhand smoke has plummeted. California's lung and bronchus cancer incidence is already declining at a significantly higher rate than that seen elsewhere in the nation. Youth smoking rates have also declined significantly. However, contrary to the message of its massive public relations campaign, the tobacco industry has not changed its stripes after the national tobacco settlement. They are still aggressively marketing their products to teenagers, ethnic minority groups, and young adults. They need to be combatted with renewed vigor by a vigilant health community. (+info)
Turning science into junk: the tobacco industry and passive smoking.
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In this issue, Glantz and Ong offer a powerful analysis of the tobacco industry's attempt to discredit the scientific evidence on passive smoking, particularly the industry's use of the label "junk science." Environmental epidemiologic studies in other arenas have also been targets for the "junk science" label. Lessons for researchers involved in high-stakes issues in the public policy arena include a need for awareness of competing interests, for transparency concerning funding, and for adherence to rigorous quality assurance and peer review practices. The goal of "sound science" seems an admirable one; it should not, however, be used to dismiss available but uncertain evidence in order to delay action. (+info)
Junking science to promote tobacco.
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Despite the tobacco industry's claims that it has changed its practices, the toll of tobacco-related disease and death continues to grow worldwide, and the industry continues to use a vast array of strategies to promote its products and increase profits. This commentary discusses the ways the tobacco industry has created controversy about risk assessment and about the scientific evidence of the health hazards of secondhand smoke. The authors recommend that policymakers be more vigilant and that they demand transparency about affiliations and linkages between allegedly independent scientists and tobacco companies. They also urge policymakers to be prepared for new and continuing challenges posed by the tobacco industry, because, despite the industry's claims, there is little evidence of fundamental change in its objectives. (+info)
Constructing "sound science" and "good epidemiology": tobacco, lawyers, and public relations firms.
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The tobacco industry has attacked "junk science" to discredit the evidence that secondhand smoke-among other environmental toxins-causes disease. Philip Morris used public relations firms and lawyers to develop a "sound science" program in the United States and Europe that involved recruiting other industries and issues to obscure the tobacco industry's role. The European "sound science" plans included a version of "good epidemiological practices" that would make it impossible to conclude that secondhand smoke-and thus other environmental toxins-caused diseases. Public health professionals need to be aware that the "sound science" movement is not an indigenous effort from within the profession to improve the quality of scientific discourse, but reflects sophisticated public relations campaigns controlled by industry executives and lawyers whose aim is to manipulate the standards of scientific proof to serve the corporate interests of their clients. (+info)
Implications for tobacco control of the multistate tobacco settlement.
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The 1998 master settlement agreement between major tobacco manufacturers and the US states will have a profound effect on many tobacco industry practices and will significantly influence future settlements with the tobacco industry. This article analyzes the settlement's key provisions pertaining to youth sales, advertising, marketing, and lobbying. It also examines the ways in which the settlement restricts industry practices as well as the many industry practices that remain unregulated. (+info)
The relation between community bans of self-service tobacco displays and store environment and between tobacco accessibility and merchant incentives.
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OBJECTIVES: These studies investigated (1) the effect of community bans of self-service tobacco displays on store environment and (2) the effect of consumer tobacco accessibility on merchants. METHODS: We counted cigarette displays (self-service, clerk-assisted, clear acrylic case) in 586 California stores. Merchant interviews (N = 198) identified consumer tobacco accessibility, tobacco company incentives, and shoplifting. RESULTS: Stores in communities with self-service tobacco display bans had fewer self-service displays and more acrylic displays but an equal total number of displays. The merchants who limited consumer tobacco accessibility received fewer incentives and reported lower shoplifting losses. In contrast, consumer access to tobacco was unrelated to the amount of monetary incentives. CONCLUSIONS: Community bans decreased self-service tobacco displays; however, exposure to tobacco advertising in acrylic displays remained high. Reducing consumer tobacco accessibility may reduce shoplifting. (+info)
Smoke and mirrors: how Massachusetts diverted millions in tobacco tax revenues.
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OBJECTIVE: This study examines the politics of appropriating Question 1 tobacco tax revenues in the first budget year after Massachusetts voters passed the ballot initiative in 1992. The initiative increased the tobacco tax on cigarettes by 25 cents per pack and on smokeless tobacco by 25% of the wholesale price. METHODS: Data were collected from newspapers, letters, memoranda, budgets, press releases, legislative floor debates, government documents, legislative journals, personal interviews, and tobacco industry documents that were downloaded from the Tobacco Archives internet site. RESULTS: During the first budget year, programmes mentioned by the initiative that were not exclusively tobacco related accounted for 27% of total Question 1 expenditures, while 50% of the revenues were allocated for programmes that were neither mentioned by the initiative nor provided any tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Only 23% of Question 1 funds were appropriated for programmes that provided exclusively tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Question 1 revenues were also used to supplant funding for pre-existing programmes, which was explicitly prohibited by the initiative. The first budget year became the template for Question 1 appropriations in subsequent fiscal years. CONCLUSION: Politics did not end after voters passed Question 1. Public health advocates lacked a strategy and budget plan to influence the appropriation of Question 1 funds after the passage of this ballot initiative. (+info)