Unilateral transplantation of human primary fetal tissue in four patients with Huntington's disease: NEST-UK safety report ISRCTN no 36485475. (1/43)

OBJECTIVES: Huntington's disease (HD) is an inherited autosomal dominant condition in which there is a CAG repeat expansion in the huntingtin gene of 36 or more. Patients display progressive motor, cognitive, and behavioural deterioration associated with progressive cell loss and atrophy in the striatum. Currently there are no disease modifying treatments and current symptomatic treatments are only partially effective in the early to moderate stages. Neural transplantation is effective in animal models of HD and offers a potential strategy for brain repair in patients. The authors report a safety study of unilateral transplantation of human fetal striatal tissue into the striatum of four patients with HD. SUBJECTS AND METHODS: Stereotaxic placements of cell suspensions of human fetal ganglionic eminence were made unilaterally into the striatum of four patients with early to moderate HD. All patients received immunotherapy with cyclosporin A, azathioprine, and prednisolone for at least six months postoperatively. Patients were assessed for safety of the procedure using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), regular recording of serum biochemistry and haematology to monitor immunotherapy, and clinical assessment according to the Core Assessment Protocol For Intrastriatal Transplantation in HD (CAPIT-HD). RESULTS: During the six month post-transplantation period, the only adverse events related to the procedure were associated with the immunotherapy. MRI demonstrated tissue at the site of implantation, but there was no sign of tissue overgrowth. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the procedure accelerated the course of the disease. CONCLUSIONS: Unilateral transplantation of human fetal striatal tissue in patients with HD is safe and feasible. Assessment of efficacy will require longer follow up in a larger number of patients.  (+info)

Conducting stroke research with an exception from the requirement for informed consent. (2/43)

BACKGROUND: Obtaining viable informed consent from stroke patients for participation in clinical trials of acute stroke therapies is often problematic because of patients' neurological deficits. Furthermore, obtaining permission from surrogates is often not possible or not legally permissible. SUMMARY OF REVIEW: In 1996 the Food and Drug Administration and Department of Health and Human Services published regulations that allow investigators to conduct emergency research without patient consent under a narrowly defined set of circumstances. We review requirements of these regulations, paying particular attention to how they may be applied in a clinical trial of an acute stroke therapy. CONCLUSIONS: Acute stroke researchers should consider conducting clinical trials with an exception from the informed consent requirement permitted by this law.  (+info)

Items of concern associated with source document verification of clinical trials for new drugs. (3/43)

In the present study, we analyzed concerns of the sponsors of clinical trials regarding source document verification (SDV) procedures performed at the University of Tokyo Hospital during April 1999 and March 2001, with special focus on the differences in description between the source document and case report form (CRF). Of 132 SDV procedures (78 protocols, 496 cases), the sponsors had problematic concerns with 348 cases (70.2%) totalling 693 items, which consisted of description inconsistencies between the source documents and the CRF (41.4%), lack of description in the CRF (39.8%), and lack of description in the source documents (8.8%). The most frequently found inconsistencies between the source documents and CRF were concerning items regarding observations, laboratory examinations, and compliance, which were associated with misdescription of clinical data and/or items for evaluation in the CRF. It was also revealed that the frequent lack of description in the CRF was associated with patient history and/or complications, adverse events, and concomitant drugs and/or therapy. In contrast, the frequent lack of description in the source documents was associated with items concerning patient background, observations, and informed consent. Further, we found that submission of a report of deviation from the protocols was required for 4.0% of the claims. These results suggest the necessity of better data management during the practice of clinical trials for the purpose of maintaining the quality of clinical trials.  (+info)

Challenges in the design of antibiotic equivalency studies: the multicenter equivalency study of oral amoxicillin versus injectable penicillin in children aged 3-59 months with severe pneumonia. (4/43)

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that children with severe pneumonia (characterized by cough or difficult breathing, as well as lower chest wall indrawing) be hospitalized and treated with parenteral penicillin. Oral amoxicillin, if equally effective for treating severe pneumonia, would address challenges associated with providing parenteral therapy, including risk of transmission of bloodborne pathogens from contaminated needles, exposure to nosocomial pathogens during hospitalization, inadequate access to health care facilities, and cost. The recently completed multicenter international trial of oral amoxicillin versus parenteral penicillin for treatment of severe pneumonia demonstrated the equivalency of these agents in children with severe pneumonia. This article focuses on the challenges of designing an equivalence study and the threats to the validity of the trial results, particularly the implications of the bias toward finding equivalence when subjects are unlikely to respond to either study therapy. These considerations have implications for use of the Amoxicillin Penicillin Pneumonia International Study (APPIS) results in clinical practice and for potential modification of WHO treatment guidelines.  (+info)

The data monitoring experience in the MOXCON trial. (5/43)

AIMS: This article describes a challenging data monitoring experience that occurred in a major international randomized placebo-controlled trial in patients with heart failure, in which the accumulating interim data showed an excess of deaths on the active treatment. METHODS AND RESULTS: The MOXonidine CONgestive Heart Failure trial was a randomized comparison of moxonidine, a central sympathetic inhibitor, with placebo. It was planned to recruit 4500 patients with heart failure. The primary endpoint was all-cause mortality, and average follow-up was anticipated to be around 2.5 years until 724 deaths occurred. The trial Data Monitoring Board (DMB) was to conduct safety monitoring reviews of interim data at least every six months, and make their recommendations to the Executive Committee. Within a few months of the study starting, the Data Monitoring Board (DMB) observed an emerging trend of an excess of deaths on moxonidine compared with placebo. This article describes the sequence of events that unfolded: several DMB meetings to evaluate the accumulating evidence, a DMB recommendation to stop the trial, consequent dialogue with the Executive Committee and sponsor leading to a final decision to stop the trial. Ten months after the first patient was randomized, the study was stopped based on 46 versus 25 deaths in 990 moxonidine and 943 placebo patients, respectively, P=0.01. The final published evidence had 54 versus 32 deaths, P=0.012. CONCLUSIONS: This study illustrates the problems faced by a DMB, and subsequently the trial Executive Committee and sponsor, in deciding how to act in the face of an emerging (and agonizing) negative trend for mortality in a major international trial.  (+info)

Issues in data monitoring and interim analysis of trials. (6/43)

OBJECTIVES: To address issues about data monitoring committees (DMCs) for randomised controlled trials (RCTs). DATA SOURCES: Electronic databases. Handsearching of selected books. Personal contacts with experts in the field. REVIEW METHODS: Systematic literature reviews of DMCs and small group processes in decision-making; sample surveys of: reports of RCTs, recently completed and ongoing RCTs and policies of major organisations involved in RCTs; case studies of four DMCs; and interviews with experienced DMC members. All focused on 23 prestated questions. RESULTS: Although still a minority, RCTs increasingly have DMCs. There is wide agreement that nearly all trials need some form of data monitoring. Central to the role of the DMC is monitoring accumulating evidence related to benefit and toxicity; variation in emphasis has been reflected in the plethora of names. DMCs for trials performed for regulatory purposes should be aware of any special requirements and regulatory consequences. Advantages were identified for both larger and smaller DMCs. There is general agreement that a DMC should be independent and multidisciplinary. Consumer and ethicist membership is controversial. The chair is recognised as being particularly influential, and likely to be most effective if he or she is experienced, understands both statistical and clinical issues, and is facilitating in style and impartial. There is no evidence available to judge suggested approaches to training. The review suggested that costs should be covered, but other rewards must be so minimal as to not affect decision-making. It is usual to have a minimum frequency of DMC meetings, with evidence that face-to-face meetings are preferable. It is common to have open sessions and a closed session. A report to a DMC should cover benefits and risks in a balanced way, summarised in an accessible style, avoiding excessive detail, and be as current as possible. Disadvantages of blinded analyses seem to outweigh advantages. Information about comparable studies should be included, although interaction with the DMCs of similar ongoing trials is controversial. A range of formal statistical approaches can be used, although this is only one of a number of considerations. DMCs usually reach decisions by consensus, but other approaches are sometimes used. The general, but not unanimous, view is that DMCs should be advisory rather than executive on the basis that it is the trial organisers who are ultimately responsible for the conduct of the trial. CONCLUSIONS: Some form of data monitoring should be considered for all RCTs, with reasons given where there is no DMC or when any member is not independent. An early DMC meeting is helpful, determining roles and responsibilities; planned operations can be agreed with investigators and sponsors/funders. A template for a DMC charter is suggested. Competing interests should be declared. DMC size (commonly three to eight people) is chosen to optimise performance. Members are usually independent and drawn from appropriate backgrounds, and some, particularly the chair, are experienced. A minimum frequency of meetings is usually agreed, with flexibility for more if needed. The DMC should understand and agree the statistical approach (and guidelines) chosen, with both the DMC statistician and analysis statistician competent to apply the method. A DMC's primary purpose is to ensure that continuing a trial according to its protocol is ethical, taking account of both individual and collective ethics. A broader remit in respect of wider ethical issues is controversial; arguably, these are primarily the responsibility of research ethics committees, trial steering committees and investigators. The DMC should know the range of recommendations or decisions open to it, in advance. A record should be kept describing the key issues discussed and the rationale for decisions taken. Errors are likely to be reduced if a DMC makes a thorough review of the evidence and has a clear understanding of how it should function, there is active participation by all members, differences are resolved through discussion and there is systematic consideration of the various decision options. DMCs should be encouraged to comment on draft final trial reports. These should include information about the data monitoring process and detail the DMC membership. It is recommended that groups responsible for data monitoring be given the standard name 'Data Monitoring Committee' (DMC). Areas for further research include: widening DMC membership beyond clinicians, trialists and statisticians; initiatives to train DMC members; methods of DMC decision-making; 'open' data monitoring; DMCs covering a portfolio of trials rather than single trials; DMC size and membership, incorporating issues of group dynamics; empirical study of the workings of DMCs and their decision-making, and which trials should or should not have a DMC.  (+info)

Preliminary data release for randomized clinical trials of noninferiority: a new proposal. (7/43)

Noninferiority trials often require a long follow-up period for the data to reach the maturity needed for definitive analysis. A proposal is presented that allows for early release of outcome data from a carefully specified subset of noninferiority trials. This subset is defined so that the early release of the data will be potentially useful to patients who face a treatment decision but will not compromise the integrity of the trial or interfere with the completion of the trial to its definitive analysis. In particular, the release of the data will only occur after the last participant has been randomly assigned and is off treatment-arm-specific therapy and only if it is unlikely that subsequent treatment and/or follow-up practices will change based on the knowledge of released data. In contrast to standard interim monitoring, (1) the release of the data would be automatic and independent of the observed data, and (2) the trial would continue on to its planned final analysis and not be stopped. Examples are given demonstrating how the proposal would work, along with a discussion of possible objections to the proposal.  (+info)

Randomized trials stopped early for harm in HIV/AIDS: a systematic survey. (8/43)

PURPOSE: The decision to stop trials early because of the harmful effects of the intervention is complex and requires weighing statistical, logistical, and ethical considerations. We assessed the prevalence of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) stopped early for harm in HIV/AIDS and determined the quality of reporting of methods to inform the decision to stop the trial. METHOD: We searched 11 electronic databases and major conference abstract databases, contacted trialist and advocacy groups, and searched the Internet. We selected RCTs stopped early for harm. We extracted data on journal and year of publication, reporting of methods and funding, planned sample size, number and planning of interim analyses, stopping rules, and effect size of the harm outcomes. RESULTS: We found 10 RCTs stopped early for harm (median, n = 85; range, 7-1227). Most interventions (n = 9) were antiviral drugs; one trial studied vitamins to prevent vertical transmission of HIV. Five studies reported a priori defined adverse events, and only 1 trial reported planned stopping guidelines. The primary harm outcomes reported across trials included toxicity, death, and increased mother-to-child transmission. Two trials were stopped due to sudden unanticipated adverse events (Stevens-Johnson syndrome, death, and encephalopathy). Relative risk point estimates for harm ranged from 1 to 6.18. Six studies reported the presence of a data safety and monitoring board. CONCLUSION: The reporting of methods to inform the decision to stop trials for harm in this population is deficient in a variety of ways, including lack of stopping guidelines. Clinicians should interpret RCTs stopped early for harm with caution and interpret the results in light of related evidence. Trialists should improve the transparency of their decision-making regarding early stopping for harmful effects.  (+info)