Origins of theory of mind, cognition and communication.
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There has been a revolution in our understanding of infant and toddler cognition that promises to have far-reaching implications for our understanding of communicative and linguistic development. Four empirical findings that helped to prompt this change in theory are analyzed: (a) Intermodal coordination--newborns operate with multimodal information, recognizing equivalences in information across sensory-modalities; (b) Imitation--newborns imitate the lip and tongue movements they see others perform; (c) Memory--young infants form long-lasting representations of perceived events and use these memories to generate motor productions after lengthy delays in novel contexts; (d) Theory of mind--by 18 months of age toddlers have adopted a theory of mind, reading below surface behavior to the goals and intentions in people's actions. This paper examines three views currently being offered in the literature to replace the classical framework of early cognitive development: modularity-nativism, connectionism, and theory-theory. Arguments are marshaled to support the "theory-theory" view. This view emphasizes a combination of innate structure and qualitative reorganization in children's thought based on input from the people and things in their culture. It is suggested that preverbal cognition forms a substrate for language acquisition and that analyzing cognition may enhance our understanding of certain disorders of communication. (+info)
Separating depersonalisation and derealisation: the relevance of the "lesion method".
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OBJECTIVES: Depersonalisation (DP) and derealisation (DR) are often met with in patients with a wide range of localisable neurological conditions. This suggests that the "lesion method" might be a valid approach to study the neurobiology of DP/DR. However, the fact that anxiety can trigger DP/DR makes it difficult to establish whether the presence of DP/DR in neurological patients is mainly determined by coexisting anxiety or by lesion location. To overcome this difficulty, we suggest the study of neurological phenomena, which although not considered as DP/DR, bear enough phenomenological resemblance with them as to warrant their use as models. METHODS: One patient with "visual hypoemotionality" and another with "hemiasomatognosia" are described in detail together with a selective literature review. RESULTS: Complaints of patients with visual hypoemotionality are indistinguishable from those of patients with "visual derealisation". There is also a phenomenological overlap between "asomatognosia" and the symptom of "body alienation", which is a central feature of depersonalisation. CONCLUSIONS: Phenomenological similarities between visual hypoemotionality and DR suggest that a disruption of the process by means of which perception becomes emotionally coloured may be an underlying mechanism in both conditions. Likewise, phenomenological overlaps with asomatognosia suggest that DP might result from parietal mechanisms disrupting the experience of body ownership and agency. These findings give validity to the notion that DP and DR may have distinct neurobiological mechanisms. (+info)
Using video modeling and reinforcement to teach perspective-taking skills to children with autism.
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We evaluated video modeling and reinforcement for teaching perspective-taking skills to 3 children with autism using a multiple baseline design. Video modeling and reinforcement were effective; however, only 2 children were able to pass an untrained task, indicating limited generalization. The findings suggest that video modeling may be an effective technology for teaching perspective taking if researchers can continue to develop strategies for enhancing the generalization of these new skills. (+info)
A MRI study of fusiform gyrus in schizotypal personality disorder.
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The fusiform gyrus is important for face and object recognition, is abnormal in schizophrenia, but has not been studied in schizotypal personality disorder (SPD). Thin-slice MR images showed no differences, either in right, left or total fusiform gyri volumes, between subjects with SPD (N=21) and normal controls (N=19). However, there was a correlation between severity of illusions and magical thinking suffered by the SPD subjects and smaller right fusiform gyrus volumes. This suggests that future studies may be useful in determining the functional competence of this gyrus in SPD. (+info)
Mothers' behavior modifications during pretense and their possible signal value for toddlers.
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An important issue for understanding early cognition is why very young children's real-world representations do not get confused by pretense events. One possible source of information for children is the pretender's behaviors. Pretender behaviors may vary systematically across real and pretend scenarios, perhaps signaling to toddlers to interpret certain events as not real. Pretender behaviors were examined in 2 experiments in which mothers were asked both to pretend to have a snack and really to have a snack with their 18-month-olds. Episodes were analyzed for condition differences in verbal and nonverbal behaviors, including smiling, looking, laughter, and functional movements. Reliable differences were found across conditions for several variables. In a 3rd experiment, children's apparent understanding of pretense in relation to their mothers' behaviors was examined, and significant associations were found with some of the mothers' behavioral changes but not others. This work provides a first inroad into the issue of how children learn to interpret pretense acts as pretense. (+info)
Memory consolidation in sleep; dream or reality.
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We discuss several lines of evidence refuting the hypothesis that procedural or declarative memories are processed/consolidated in sleep. One of the strongest arguments against a role for sleep in declarative memory involves the demonstration that the marked suppression or elimination of REM sleep in subjects on antidepressant drugs or with brainstem lesions produces no detrimental effects on cognition. Procedural memory, like declarative memory, undergoes a slow, time-dependent period of consolidation. A process has recently been described wherein performance on some procedural tasks improves with the mere passage of time and has been termed "enhancement." Some studies, but not others, have reported that the consolidation/enhancement of perceptual and motor skills is dependent on sleep. We suggest that consolidation or enhancement, initiated in waking with task acquisition, could in some instances extend to sleep, but sleep would serve no unique role in these processes. In sum, there is no compelling evidence to support a relationship between sleep and memory consolidation. (+info)
Brain correlates of subjective reality of physically and psychologically induced pain.
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Meaningful behavior requires successful differentiation of events surfacing from one's mind from those arising from the external world. Such judgements may be especially demanding during pain because of the strong contribution from psychological factors to this experience. It is unknown how the subjective reality of pain (SRP) is constructed in the human brain, and neuronal mechanisms of the subjective reality are poorly understood in general. To address these questions, 14 suggestion-prone healthy subjects rated reality of pain that was induced either by laser pulses to the skin or by hypnotic suggestion during functional MRI. Both pain states were associated with activation of the brain's pain circuitry. During laser stimulation, the sensory parts of this circuitry were activated more strongly, and their activation strengths correlated positively with the SRP. During suggestion-induced pain, the reality estimates were lower and correlated positively with activation strengths in the rostral and perigenual anterior cingulate cortex and in the pericingulate regions of the medial prefrontal cortex; a similar trend was evident during laser-induced pain. These findings support the view that information about sensory-discriminative characteristics of pain contributes to the SRP. Differences in such information between physically and psychologically induced pain, however, could be quantitative rather than qualitative and therefore insufficient for judging the reality of pain without knowledge about the source of this information. The medial prefrontal cortex is a likely area to contribute to such source monitoring. (+info)
Seeing it my way: a case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective.
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Little is known about the functional and neural architecture of social reasoning, one major obstacle being that we crucially lack the relevant tools to test potentially different social reasoning components. In the case of belief reasoning, previous studies have tried to separate the processes involved in belief reasoning per se from those involved in the processing of the high incidental demands such as the working memory demands of typical belief tasks. In this study, we developed new belief tasks in order to disentangle, for the first time, two perspective taking components involved in belief reasoning: (i) the ability to inhibit one's own perspective (self-perspective inhibition); and (ii) the ability to infer someone else's perspective as such (other-perspective taking). The two tasks had similar demands in other-perspective taking as they both required the participant to infer that a character has a false belief about an object's location. However, the tasks varied in the self-perspective inhibition demands. In the task with the lowest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character's false belief, he or she had no idea what the new object's location was. In contrast, in the task with the highest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character's false belief, he or she knew where the object was actually located (and this knowledge had thus to be inhibited). The two tasks were presented to a stroke patient, WBA, with right prefrontal and temporal damage. WBA performed well in the low-inhibition false-belief task but showed striking difficulty in the task placing high self-perspective inhibition demands, showing a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. WBA also made egocentric errors in other social and visual perspective taking tasks, indicating a difficulty with belief attribution extending to the attribution of emotions, desires and visual experiences to other people. The case of WBA, together with the recent report of three patients impaired in belief reasoning even when self-perspective inhibition demands were reduced, provide the first neuropsychological evidence that the inhibition of one's own point of view and the ability to infer someone else's point of view rely on distinct neural and functional processes. (+info)