Religious and philosophical exemptions from vaccination requirements and lessons learned from conscientious objectors from conscription.
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All jurisdictions in the US require proof of vaccination for school entrance. Most states permit non-medical exemptions. Public health officials must balance the rights of individuals to choose whether or not to vaccinate their children with the individual and societal risks associated with choosing not to vaccinate (i.e., claiming an exemption). To assist the public health community in optimally reaching this balance, this analysis examines the constitutional basis of non-medical exemptions and examines policies governing conscientious objection to conscription as a possible model. The jurisprudence that the US Supreme Court has developed in cases in which religious beliefs conflict with public or state interests suggests that mandatory immunization against dangerous diseases does not violate the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Accordingly, states do not have a constitutional obligation to enact religious exemptions. Applying the model of conscientious objectors to conscription suggests that if states choose to offer nonmedical exemptions, they may be able to optimally balance individual freedoms with public good by considering the sincerity of beliefs and requiring parents considering exemptions to attend individual educational counseling. (+info)
The role of the church in developing the law.
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The church and other community organisations have a legitimate role to play in influencing public policy. However, intervention by the church and other religious bodies in recent litigation in Australia and the United Kingdom raises questions about the appropriateness of such bodies being permitted to intervene directly in the court process as amici curiae. We argue that there are dangers in such bodies insinuating their doctrine under the guise of legal argument in civil proceedings, but find it difficult to enunciate a principled distinction between doctrine and legal argument. We advise that judges should exercise caution in dealing with amicus submissions. (+info)
Commentary on Skene and Parker: the role of a church (or other ideologically based interest group) in developing the law--a plea for ethereal intervention.
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This paper discusses the provocative views of Skene and Parker as to the role of religious or other ideologically based interest groups in law and policy making. We draw distinctions between doctrine and prejudice and between argument and ideology which we trust take the debate further. Finally we recommend an ethereal, democratic, and populist partial solution. (+info)
Religious meddling: a comment on Skene and Parker.
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The question of churches resorting to the courts to influence public policy is one that concerns the appropriate role of the courts and the appropriate conduct of religious authorities. I agree with Skene and Parker that there is no principled legal reason to exclude such interventions out of hand; but my comments are principally addressed to the political and religious reasons for being rightly concerned about such activity. These advert both to the nature of the liberal democratic compromise and to the nature and scope of religious authority (at least within Christianity). (+info)
The role of the church in developing the law: an Islamic response.
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The concept of Hisba in Muslim law has been used by members of certain Islamic groups to impose, through the courts, limitations on freedom of expression. In so doing they sought to circumvent the right of parliament to legislate on matters of personal freedom. This device is now restricted by the Egyptian authorities. (+info)
Commentary on Skene and Parker: the role of the church in developing the law.
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Skene and Parker are demonstrably mistaken in suggesting that the amicus role of Catholic bishops in three cases has been concerned with "developing" the law. In contrast with Skene and Parker's freestanding conception of legal principle, the Catholic understanding of law's rational moral foundations has permitted Catholic bishops to defend longstanding legal principle as well as defending the integrity of the church's health care and welfare services. It is shown that in the three cases under discussion Catholic bishops were providing needed argument otherwise unavailable to the courts in defence of existing statute. In face of the attempts by pressure groups to bypass the legislature and use the courts to subvert fundamental legal principles, the church is perhaps uniquely capable of continuing to provide to the courts rational defences of those principles. (+info)
Democracy, embryonic stem cell research, and the Roman Catholic church.
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The Roman Catholic Church in Australia has lobbied politicians to prohibit embryonic stem cell research, on the grounds that such research violates the sanctity and inherent dignity of human life. I suggest, however, that reasoned reflection does not uniquely support such conclusions about the morality of stem cell research. A recent parliamentary standing committee report recommended that embryonic stem cell research be allowed to proceed in certain circumstances, and there appears to be widespread support in the Australian community for this position. I argue that the moral value of democracy requires parliamentarians to acknowledge the informed views of the wider community here, and to resist lobbying by church leaders on this issue. (+info)
Surgery and religiosity.
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Variances in religious practices and beliefs require health care providers to find alternative ways of meeting medical standards of care in cases where religious beliefs preclude the use of blood transfusions or blood products. We report a case of head and neck tumor with low hemoglobin in which we utilized temporary arterial ligation to aid in minimal blood loss. (+info)