Decline in cigarette consumption following implementation of a comprehensive tobacco prevention and education program--Oregon, 1996-1998. (1/764)

In November 1996, residents of Oregon approved a ballot measure increasing the cigarette tax by 30 cents (to 68 cents per pack). The measure stipulated that 10% of the additional tax revenue be allocated to the Oregon Health Division (OHD) to develop and implement a tobacco-use prevention program. In 1997, OHD created Oregon's Tobacco Prevention and Education Program (TPEP), a comprehensive, community-based program modeled on the successful tobacco-use prevention programs in California and Massachusetts. To assess the effects of the tax increase and TPEP in Oregon, OHD evaluated data on the number of packs of cigarettes taxed before (1993-1996) and after (1997-1998) the ballot initiative and implementation of the program. Oregon's results also were compared with national data. This report summarizes the results of the analysis, which indicate that consumption of cigarettes in Oregon declined substantially after implementation of the excise tax and TPEP and exceeded the national rate of decline.  (+info)

Settling for less? Tobacco industry. (2/764)

In November 1998, a coalition of state negotiators and five tobacco companies reached an agreement in which the cigarette makers would pay out the biggest financial settlement in history, $206 billion over the next 25 years to 46 states, to compensate for the medical treatment of patients suffering from tobacco-related health problems. Critics of the settlement say the tobacco companies are getting off the hook too easily, and that the deal's public health provisions are unacceptably riddled with loopholes. But the attorneys general who negotiated the settlement defended it as a good deal-but clearly not as a panacea. Ultimately, they feel, Congress should pass legislation to provide essential reforms, including full Food and Drug Administration authority over tobacco.  (+info)

Turning over a new leaf. Tobacco. (3/764)

Anticipating a diminishing market for cigarettes and other tobacco products in the future, researchers around the country are studying alternative uses for tobacco plants. The most promising field of research for tobacco involves the genetic engineering of tobacco plants to produce various substances such as industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and consumer product ingredients. Tobacco has been called the "fruit fly of the plant kingdom" because of the ease with which it can be genetically engineered. There are countless possibilities for the use of tobacco, but current efforts are concentrating on engineering tobacco to produce vaccines, human enzymes, and plastics. Tobacco researchers have been successful in expressing bovine lysozyme, an enzyme with antibacterial properties, and insulin.  (+info)

Tobacco control advocates must demand high-quality media campaigns: the California experience. (4/764)

OBJECTIVE: To document efforts on the part of public officials in California to soften the media campaign's attack on the tobacco industry and to analyse strategies to counter those efforts on the part of tobacco control advocates. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with programme participants, direct observation, written materials, and media stories. In addition, internal documents were released by the state's Department of Health Services in response to requests made under the California Public Records Act by Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights. Finally, a draft of the paper was circulated to 11 key players for their comments. RESULTS: In 1988 california voters enacted Proposition 99, an initiative that raised the tobacco tax by $0.25 and allocated 20% of the revenues to anti-tobacco education. A media campaign, which was part of the education programme, directly attacked the tobacco industry, exposing the media campaign to politically based efforts to shut it down or soften it. Through use of outsider strategies such as advertising, press conferences, and public meetings, programme advocates were able to counter the efforts to soften the campaign. CONCLUSION: Anti-tobacco media campaigns that expose industry manipulation are a key component of an effective tobacco control programme. The effectiveness of these campaigns, however, makes them a target for elimination by the tobacco industry. The experience from California demonstrates the need for continuing, aggressive intervention by nongovernmental organisations in order to maintain the quality of anti-tobacco media campaigns.  (+info)

Features of sales promotion in cigarette magazine advertisements, 1980-1993: an analysis of youth exposure in the United States. (5/764)

OBJECTIVE: To examine the presence of features of sales promotion in cigarette advertising in United States magazines, and to describe trends in youth (ages 12-17) exposure to such advertising (termed "promotional advertising"). DESIGN: Analysis of 1980-1993 annual data on: (a) total pages and expenditures for "promotional advertising" (advertising that contains features of sales promotion) in 36 popular magazines (all magazines for which data were available), by cigarette brand; and (b) readership characteristics for each magazine. We defined promotional advertising as advertisements that go beyond the simple advertising of the product and its features to include one or more features of sales promotion, such as coupons, "retail value added" promotions, contests, sweepstakes, catalogues, specialty item distribution, and sponsorship of public entertainment or sporting events. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Total pages of, and expenditures for promotional advertising in magazines; and gross impressions (number of readers multiplied by the number of pages of promotional advertising) among youth and total readership. RESULTS: During the period 1980-1993, tobacco companies spent $90.2 million on promotional advertising in the 36 magazines. The proportion of promotional advertising appearing in "youth" magazines (defined as magazines with a greater than average proportion of youth readers) increased from 7% in 1980 to nearly 100% in 1987. Although youth readers represented only 19% of magazine readers, the proportion of youth gross impressions to total gross impressions of tobacco promotional advertising exceeded this value throughout the entire period 1985-1993, peaking at 33% in 1987. The five "youth" cigarette brands (defined as brands smoked by at least 2.5% of smokers aged 10-15 years in 1993) accounted for 59% of promotional advertising in all magazines, but for 83% of promotional advertising in youth magazines during the study period. CONCLUSIONS: In their magazine advertising, cigarette companies are preferentially exposing young people to advertisements that contain sales promotional features.  (+info)

Sharing the blame: smoking experimentation and future smoking-attributable mortality due to Joe Camel and Marlboro advertising and promotions. (6/764)

BACKGROUND: Despite public denials, internal tobacco company documents indicate that adolescents have long been the target of cigarette advertising and promotional activities. Recent longitudinal evidence suggests that 34% of new experimentation occurs because of advertising and promotions. OBJECTIVE: To apportion responsibility for smoking experimentation and future smoking-attributable mortality among major cigarette brands attractive to young people (Camel and Marlboro). DATA SOURCES, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Data were from confirmed never-smoking adolescents (12-17 years old) responding to the 1993 (n = 2659) and 1996 (n = 2779) population-based California Tobacco Surveys. MAIN OUTCOMES: Adolescents named the brand of their favourite cigarette advertisements and tobacco promotional items. Using these "market shares" and the relative importance of advertising and promotions in encouraging smoking, we estimated how many new experimenters from 1988 to 1998 in the United States can be attributed to Camel and Marlboro. From other data on the natural history of smoking, we projected how many future deaths in the United States can be attributed to each brand. RESULTS: Although Camel advertisements were favoured more than Marlboro and other brands in 1993 and 1996, the "market share" for promotional items shifted markedly during this period from Camel and other brands towards Marlboro. We estimated that between 1988 and 1998, there will be 7.9 million new experimenters because of tobacco advertising and promotions. This will result in 4.7 million new established smokers: 2.1, 1.2, and 1.4 million due to Camel, Marlboro, and other brands' advertising and promotions, respectively. Of these, 1.2 million will eventually die from smoking-attributable diseases: 520,000 from Camel, 300,000 from Marlboro, and the remainder from other brands. CONCLUSIONS: Our analysis provides a reasonable first estimate at sharing the blame for the long-term health consequences of smoking among the major brands that encourage adolescents to start smoking.  (+info)

Consensus for tobacco policy among former state legislators using the policy Delphi method. (7/764)

OBJECTIVE: To test a novel approach for building consensus about tobacco control policies among legislators. DESIGN: A pilot study was conducted using a two-round, face-to-face policy Delphi method. PARTICIPANTS: Randomly selected sample of 30 former Kentucky legislators (60% participation rate). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Consensus on tobacco control and tobacco farming policies. RESULTS: Former state legislators were more supportive of tobacco control policies than expected, and highly supportive of lessening the state's dependence on tobacco. Former state legislators were in agreement with 43% of the second-round items for which there was no agreement at the first round, demonstrating a striking increase in consensus. With new information from their colleagues, former lawmakers became more supportive of workplace smoking restrictions, limitations on tobacco promotional items, and modest excise tax increases. CONCLUSIONS: The policy Delphi method has the potential for building consensus for tobacco control and tobacco farming policies among state legislators. Tobacco control advocates in other states might consider using the policy Delphi method with policymakers in public and private sectors.  (+info)

Arizona's tobacco control initiative illustrates the need for continuing oversight by tobacco control advocates. (8/764)

BACKGROUND: In 1994, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 which increased the tobacco tax and earmarked 23% of the new revenues for tobacco education programmes. OBJECTIVE: To describe the campaign to pass Proposition 200, the legislative debate that followed the passage of the initiative, and the development and implementation of the tobacco control programme. DESIGN: This is a case study. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key players in the initiative campaign and in the tobacco education programme, and written records (campaign material, newspapers, memoranda, public records). RESULTS: Despite opposition from the tobacco industry, Arizonans approved an increase in the tobacco tax. At the legislature, health advocates in Arizona successfully fought the tobacco industry attempts to divert the health education funds and pass preemptive legislation. The executive branch limited the scope of the programme to adolescents and pregnant women. It also prevented the programme from attacking the tobacco industry or focusing on secondhand smoke. Health advocates did not put enough pressure at the executive branch to force it to develop a comprehensive tobacco education programme. CONCLUSIONS: It is not enough for health advocates to campaign for an increase in tobacco tax and to protect the funds at the legislature. Tobacco control advocates must closely monitor the development and implementation of tax-funded tobacco education programmes at the administrative level and be willing to press the executive to implement effective programmes.  (+info)