Large-scale use of freeze-dried smallpox vaccine prepared in primary cultures of rabbit kidney cells.
(9/360)
A lyophilized smallpox vaccine made from infected monolayer cultures of primary rabbit kidney cells was used together with a calf lymph vaccine in a field trial in Lombok, Indonesia, in 1973. About 60 000 children below 15 years of age were vaccinated: some 50 000 with the tissue culture vaccine and about 10 000 with calf lymph vaccine. Similar results were obtained with both vaccines in primary vaccinees and in revaccinees as regards the take rate, pock reactions, and serious secondary reactions. (+info)
When is a disease eradicable? 100 years of lessons learned.
(10/360)
Since the 1915 launch of the first international eradication initiative targeting a human pathogen, much has been learned about the determinants of eradicability of an organism. The authors outline the first 4 eradication efforts, summarizing the lessons learned in terms of the 3 types of criteria for disease eradication programs: (1) biological and technical feasibility, (2) costs and benefits, and (3) societal and political considerations. (+info)
Recent events and observations pertaining to smallpox virus destruction in 2002.
(11/360)
To destroy all remaining stocks of variola virus on or before 31 December 2002 seems an even more compelling goal today than it did in 1999, when the 52d World Health Assembly authorized temporary retention of remaining stocks to facilitate the possible development of (1) a more attenuated, less reactogenic smallpox vaccine and (2) an antiviral drug that could be used in treatment of patients with smallpox. We believe the deadline established in 1999 should be adhered to, given the potential outcomes of present research. Although verification that every country will have destroyed its stock of virus is impossible, it is reasonable to assume that the risk of a smallpox virus release would be diminished were the World Health Assembly to call on each country to destroy its stocks of smallpox virus and to state that any person, laboratory, or country found to have virus after date x would be guilty of a crime against humanity. (+info)
Recognition of illness associated with the intentional release of a biologic agent.
(12/360)
On September 11, 2001, following the terrorist incidents in New York City and Washington, D.C., CDC recommended heightened surveillance for any unusual disease occurrence or increased numbers of illnesses that might be associated with the terrorist attacks. Subsequently, cases of anthrax in Florida and New York City have demonstrated the risks associated with intentional release of biologic agents. This report provides guidance for health-care providers and public health personnel about recognizing illnesses or patterns of illnessthat might be associated with intentional release of biologic agents. (+info)
Countering the posteradication threat of smallpox and polio.
(13/360)
After eradication, there is a small but finite risk that smallpox and/or poliomyelitis viruses could accidentally escape from a laboratory or be released intentionally. The reintroduction of either virus into a highly susceptible population could develop into a serious catastrophe. To counter such an occurrence will require the use of vaccine, perhaps in substantial quantities. In the United States, new stocks of smallpox vaccine are being procured and arrangements are being made for a standby production facility. Similar provisions need to be considered for polio. To counter an epidemic of polio will require the use of the oral vaccine, which is presently the World Health Organization-recommended vaccine of choice for countries throughout the developing world. In these countries, its continued use is advised because of its ability to induce intestinal immunity, its ability to spread to other susceptible household members and to protect them, its ease of administration, and its low cost. (+info)
Developing new smallpox vaccines.
(14/360)
New stockpiles of smallpox vaccine are required as a contingency for protecting civilian and military personnel against deliberate dissemination of smallpox virus by terrorists or unfriendly governments. The smallpox vaccine in the current stockpile consists of a live animal poxvirus (Vaccinia virus [VACV]) that was grown on the skin of calves. Because of potential issues with controlling this earlier manufacturing process, which included scraping VACV lesions from calfskin, new vaccines are being developed and manufactured by using viral propagation on well-characterized cell substrates. We describe, from a regulatory perspective, the various strains of VACV, the adverse events associated with calf lymph-propagated smallpox vaccine, the issues regarding selection and use of cell substrates for vaccine production, and the issues involved in demonstrating evidence of safety and efficacy. (+info)
Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
(15/360)
We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate. (+info)
Biological and chemical terrorism: recognition and management.
(16/360)
Primary care physicians will be on the front line in detecting and managing any future terrorist attacks that use chemical or biological agents. This article reviews how to recognize and treat disease caused by exposure to nerve agents, blistering agents, hydrogen cyanide, ricin, anthrax, smallpox, plague, and botulinum toxin. (+info)