British Andrology Society guidelines for the screening of semen donors for donor insemination (1999).
The British Andrology Society (BAS) guidelines for the screening of semen donors have undergone a recent review, and following consultation with members of the Society and with experts in the allied professions, the following revised guidelines have been issued. Major changes include the introduction of an upper age limit for semen donors (<40 years old) and the general exclusion of men who are seropositive for cytomegalovirus as donors. The BAS recommends the screening of prospective semen donors for chromosomal abnormalities and for cystic fibrosis carrier status. Following the report of cross-contamination of human cells with hepatitis B virus within a liquid nitrogen storage vessel, the BAS recommends that steps be taken to ensure the safe cryopreservation of donor gametes. (+info)
Surveillance of influenza viruses isolated from travellers at Nagoya International Airport.
In order to conduct a survey of influenza viruses entering Japan via travellers arriving by airplanes, gargle solutions were collected from passengers who reported to the quarantine station of Nagoya International Airport complaining of respiratory symptoms. From 504 samples collected between August 1996 and March 1999, 30 influenza virus strains were isolated. Twenty-eight of the isolates were influenza A (H3N2) viruses and two were influenza B viruses. No H1N1 virus was isolated. Among 28 isolates of H3N2 virus, 3 strains were obtained outside the influenza season. Nucleotide sequences of the haemagglutinin (HA) genes of these isolates along with those from domestic patients were analysed in order to determine the influence of imported influenza viruses by travellers on epidemics in Japan. From the phylogenetic and chronological aspects, the possibility was suggested in one case in 1997/8 and two in the 1998/9 season that imported virus by travellers may have influenced the domestic influenza epidemics. (+info)
Control of communicable diseases; apprehension and detention of persons with specific diseases; transfer of regulations. Food and Drug Administration and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HHS. Final rule.
The Secretary of Health and Human Service (the Secretary) is transferring a portion of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) "Control of Communicable Diseases" regulations to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In general, these regulations provide the Secretary with the authority to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release individuals to prevent the spread of specified communicable diseases. The regulations implement the provisions of the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act) to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from one State or possession into any other State or possession. CDC will have authority for interstate quarantine over persons, while FDA will retain regulatory authority over animals and other products that may transmit or spread communicable diseases. The Secretary is taking this action to consolidate regulations designed to control the spread of communicable diseases, thereby increasing the agencies' efficiency and effectiveness. (+info)
The law, human rights, and the detention of individuals with tuberculosis in England and Wales.
BACKGROUND: Tuberculosis poses a global public health threat, and individuals who fail to comply with treatment risk developing drug-resistant strains, which are a serious public health concern. A number of individuals who have been deemed to pose a 'serious risk of infection' to others have been detained in recent years in England and Wales under the Public Health Act 1984. With the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into British law due to take effect shortly this paper examines the justness of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act, and asks whether the Act stands up to scrutiny under the ECHR. METHODS: A critical review, including an examination of recently opened relevant files at the Public Record Office, was carried out on Sections 37 and 38 of the Public Health Act 1984. RESULTS: Sections 37 and 38 of the Public Health Act 1984 fail to provide sufficient safeguards from abuse and fall short of the requirements of the ECHR. CONCLUSIONS: Sections 37 and 38 should be replaced. Greater safeguards to protect the rights of those with infectious diseases are needed. (+info)
Paramyxovirus infection in caiman lizards (Draecena guianensis).
Three separate epidemics occurred in caiman lizards (Dracaena guianensis) that were imported into the USA from Peru in late 1998 and early 1999. Histologic evaluation of tissues from necropsied lizards demonstrated a proliferative pneumonia. Electron microscopic examination of lung tissue revealed a virus that was consistent with members of the family Paramyxoviridae. Using a rabbit polyclonal antibody against an isolate of ophidian (snake) paramyxovirus, an immunoperoxidase staining technique demonstrated immunoreactivity within pulmonary epithelial cells of 1 lizard. Homogenates of lung, brain, liver, or kidney from affected lizards were placed in flasks containing monolayers of either terrapene heart cells or viper heart cells. Five to 10 days later, syncytial cells formed. When Vero cells were inoculated with supernatant of infected terrapene heart cells, similar syncytial cells developed. Electron microscopic evaluation of infected terrapene heart cells revealed intracytoplasmic inclusions consisting of nucleocapsid strands. Using negative-staining electron microscopy, abundant filamentous nucleocapsid material with a herringbone structure typical of the Paramyxoviridae was observed in culture medium of infected viper heart cells. Seven months following the initial epizootic, blood samples were collected from surviving group 1 lizards, and a hemagglutination inhibition assay was performed to determine presence of specific antibody against the caiman lizard isolate. Of the 17 lizards sampled, 7 had titers of < or =1:20 and 10 had titers of >1:20 and < or =1:80. This report is only the second of a paramyxovirus identified in a lizard and is the first to snow the relationship between histologic and ultrastructural findings and virus isolation. (+info)
The foot-and-mouth epidemic in Great Britain: pattern of spread and impact of interventions.
We present an analysis of the current foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Great Britain over the first 2 months of the spread of the virus. The net transmission potential of the pathogen and the increasing impact of control measures are estimated over the course of the epidemic to date. These results are used to parameterize a mathematical model of disease transmission that captures the differing spatial contact patterns between farms before and after the imposition of movement restrictions. The model is used to make predictions of future incidence and to simulate the impact of additional control strategies. Hastening the slaughter of animals with suspected infection is predicted to slow the epidemic, but more drastic action, such as "ring" culling or vaccination around infection foci, is necessary for more rapid control. Culling is predicted to be more effective than vaccination. (+info)
AIDS and ethics: an analytic framework.
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) pandemic has raised difficult ethical issues in public policy formulation and in the care of patients infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Many issues relate to measures proposed for the protection of the public from HIV infection. This article presents an analytic framework from which these measures can be rationally evaluated. Specific measures are assessed on the basis of their likelihood of success, in relation to their justification for infringement on individual rights, and with reference to other less intrusive measures that could accomplish the same objective. Case histories are discussed which raise ethical dilemmas in the care of HIV infected and high-risk patients. The application of this framework could assist physicians in analysing public health policy and making judgements in individual clinical situations. (+info)
Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.
We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate. (+info)