Medical care expenditures under gatekeeper and point-of-service arrangements.
(1/4)
OBJECTIVE: To compare expenditures for medical care in a closed-panel gatekeeper HMO and an open-panel point-of-service (POS) plan that share the same provider network. DATA SOURCE/STUDY SETTING: The two study HMOs are distinct product lines of a single managed care organization; both plans are commercial products. We used administrative data files from the study plans for 1994-95 to assess differences in total medical care expenditures and spending for five categories of services: physician services, inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, prescription drugs, and other services. STUDY DESIGN: Multivariate analyses were based on the two-part model of the demand for medical care. The dependent variables in these models were expenditures in each of the five categories of services, and the independent variables were indicator variables for plan type and visit copayments, prescription drug copayment, distance to the nearest primary care physician (PCP), demographic characteristics, chronic conditions, area characteristics, and entry/exit indicator variables. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Total expenditures for medical care ranged from equal in both plans to 7 percent higher in the gatekeeper HMO (p < .10), depending on the copayments for physician visits. Expenditures were not higher in the POS plan for any of the five categories of services. These findings were robust to a wide range of sensitivity analyses. CONCLUSIONS: Direct patient access to specialists in POS plans does not necessarily result in higher medical care expenditures. When POS enrollees are required to choose PCPs, patient cost sharing, physician financial incentives, and utilization review may control expenditures without constraining direct patient access to providers. (+info)
Freedom of choice of specialist physicians is important to Swiss resident: a cross-sectional study.
(2/4)
The spread of state any willing provider laws.
(4/4)
OBJECTIVE: To describe the growth of any willing provider (AWP) and freedom of choice (FOC) laws applicable to managed care firms and to explore empirically the determinants of their enactment. STUDY SETTING: A 1996 compendium of state laws and state-level data from the 1991-1994 period. STUDY DESIGN: Pooled cross-section time-series logistic regression of the decision to enact various types of AWP and FOC laws. Analysis uses a public choice framework to examine enactment. Key variables include proxy measures of proponent and opponent strength and the political environment. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The model works well for laws affecting hospitals, but performs poorly for physician and pharmacy laws. More providers are associated with the enactment of AWP and FOC laws. More large employers are associated with a reduced likelihood of enactment of some forms of the laws but not others. Conservative states are more likely to enact laws limiting selective contracting with hospitals and physicians. States with greater interparty competition are also more likely to adopt some types of legislation. CONCLUSIONS: The empirical results generally are consistent with the view that AWP and FOC laws are often enacted as a defensive strategy on the part of providers, but additional research is needed to provide a more definitive assessment of the determinants of these laws. Suggestions for future research are provided. (+info)