Fetal alcohol syndrome: the origins of a moral panic.
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Since its discovery almost 30 years ago, the fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) has been characterized in the USA, as a major threat to public health. In part because FAS resonated with broader social concerns in the 1970s and 1980s about alcohol's deleterious effect on American society and about a perceived increase in child abuse and neglect, it quickly achieved prominence as a social problem. In this paper, we demonstrate that, as concern about this social problem escalated beyond the level warranted by the existing evidence, FAS took on the status of a moral panic. Through examples taken from both the biomedical literature and the media about drinking during pregnancy, we illustrate the evolution of this development, and we describe its implications, particularly how it has contributed to a vapid public policy response. (+info)
Supporting the moral development of medical students.
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Philosophers who studied moral development have found that individuals normally progress rapidly in early adulthood from a conventional stage in which they base behavior on the norms and values of those around them to a more principled stage where they identify and attempt to live by personal moral values. Available data suggest that many medical students, who should be in this transition, show little change in their moral development. Possibly, this relates to perceived pressures to conform to the informal culture of the medical wards. Many students experience considerable internal dissidence as they struggle to accommodate personal values related to empathy, care, and compassion to their clinical training. Educational interventions that positively influence this process have established regular opportunities for critical reflection by the students in small groups. Other interventions include faculty development to enhance role modeling and feedback by clinical faculty. The author espouses more widespread adoption of these educational interventions. (+info)
Causal authorship and the equality principle: a defence of the acts/omissions distinction in euthanasia.
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This paper defends the acts/omissions distinction which underpins the present law on euthanasia, from various criticisms (including from within the judiciary itself), and aims to show that it is supported by fundamental principles. After rejecting arguments that deny the coherence and/or legal relevance of the distinction, the discussion proceeds to focus on the causal relationship between the doctor and the patient's death in each case. Although previous analyses, challenging the causal efficacy of omissions generally, are shown to be deficient, it is argued that in certain cases of causing death by omission the causal authorship of the doctor lapses. The final part of the paper examines why this should be morally significant and proposes an answer in terms of the principle of equality. Assuming all other factors are equal, the infringement of this principle provides an additional reason against actively killing a patient, which is not present in cases of passively letting die. (+info)
Are medical ethicists out of touch? Practitioner attitudes in the US and UK towards decisions at the end of life.
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OBJECTIVES: To assess whether UK and US health care professionals share the views of medical ethicists about medical futility, withdrawing/withholding treatment, ordinary/extraordinary interventions, and the doctrine of double effect. DESIGN, SUBJECTS AND SETTING: A 138-item attitudinal questionnaire completed by 469 UK nurses studying the Open University course on "Death and Dying" was compared with a similar questionnaire administered to 759 US nurses and 687 US doctors taking the Hastings Center course on "Decisions near the End of Life". RESULTS: Practitioners accept the relevance of concepts widely disparaged by bioethicists: double effect, medical futility, and the distinctions between heroic/ordinary interventions and withholding/withdrawing treatment. Within the UK nurses' group a "rationalist" axis of respondents who describe themselves as having "no religion" are closer to the bioethics consensus on withholding and withdrawing treatment. CONCLUSIONS: Professionals' beliefs differ substantially from the recommendations of their professional bodies and from majority opinion in bioethics. Bioethicists should be cautious about assuming that their opinions will be readily accepted by practitioners. (+info)
Choices without reasons: citizens' juries and policy evaluation.
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Citizens' juries are commended as a new technique for democratising health service reviews. Their usefulness is said to derive from a reliance on citizens' rational deliberation rather than on the immediate preferences of the consumer. The author questions the assertion of critical detachment and asks whether juries do in fact employ reason as a means of resolving fundamental disagreements about service provision. He shows that juries promote not so much a critically detached point of view as a particular evaluative framework suited to the bureaucratic idiom of social welfare maximisation. Reports of jury practice reveal a tendency among juries to suppress by non-rational means the everyday moral language of health care evaluation and substitute for it a system of thought in which it can be deemed permissible to deny treatment to sick people. The author concludes that juries are chiefly concerned with non-rational persuasion and because of this they are morally and democratically irrelevant. Juries are no substitute for voting when it comes to protecting the public from zealous minorities. (+info)
'If you pay, we'll operate immediately'.
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OBJECTIVES: To study the attitudes of health care staff in four postcommunist countries towards taking gifts from their clients--and their confessed experience of actually taking such gifts. DESIGN: Survey questionnaire administered to officials including health care staff, supplemented by focus-group discussions with the general public. SETTING: Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. PARTICIPANTS: A quota sample of 1,307 officials including 292 health care staff, supplemented by stratified national random samples of 4,778 ordinary members of the public and in-depth interviews or focus-group discussions involving another 323. MAIN MEASUREMENTS: Explicit justifications and willingness to accept offers, reported frequency of offers, and personal confessions to accepting "money and expensive presents" as well as smaller gifts. RESULTS: Health care staff were far more inclined than the average official or public servant to accept "money or an expensive present" if offered, far more inclined to justify asking clients for "extra payments", and far more inclined to confess that they had actually taken gifts from clients recently. Judged by their own confessions, hospital doctors were only rivalled by traffic police and customs officials for taking money or expensive gifts from their clients. CONCLUSIONS: Poor pay does not explain why doctors so often took large gifts from their clients. Moral self justification, opportunity, and bargaining power are much more effective explanations. (+info)
The morality of coercion.
(23/615)
The author congratulates Dr Brian Hurwitz, who recently reported the successful "intimidation" of an elderly competent widow into accepting badly needed therapy for a huge ulcerated carcinoma. He reports approvingly of the Israeli Patients' Rights Law, enacted in 1996, which demands detailed informed consent from competent patients before permitting treatment. But the law also provides an escape clause which permits coercing a competent patient into accepting life-saving therapy if an ethics committee feels that if treatment is imposed the patient will give his/her consent retroactively. He suggests this approach as an appropriate middle road between overbearing paternalism and untrammelled autonomy. (+info)
Parental duties and untreatable genetic conditions.
(24/615)
This paper considers parental duties of beneficence and non-maleficence to use prenatal genetic testing for non-treatable conditions. It is proposed that this can be a duty only if the testing is essential to protect the interests of the child i.e. only if there is a risk of the child being born to a life worse than non-existence. It is argued here that non-existence can be rationally preferred to a severely impaired life. Uncontrollable pain and a lack of any opportunity to develop a continuous self are considered to be sufficient criteria for such preference. When parents are at risk of having a child whose life would be worse than non-existence, the parents have a duty to use prenatal testing and a duty to terminate an affected pregnancy. Further, such duty does not apply to any conditions where the resulting life can be considered better than non-existence. (+info)