Building a motor simulation de novo: observation of dance by dancers.
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Research on action simulation identifies brain areas that are active while imagining or performing simple overlearned actions. Are areas engaged during imagined movement sensitive to the amount of actual physical practice? In the present study, participants were expert dancers who learned and rehearsed novel, complex whole-body dance sequences 5 h a week across 5 weeks. Brain activity was recorded weekly by fMRI as dancers observed and imagined performing different movement sequences. Half these sequences were rehearsed and half were unpracticed control movements. After each trial, participants rated how well they could perform the movement. We hypothesized that activity in premotor areas would increase as participants observed and simulated movements that they had learnt outside the scanner. Dancers' ratings of their ability to perform rehearsed sequences, but not the control sequences, increased with training. When dancers observed and simulated another dancer's movements, brain regions classically associated with both action simulation and action observation were active, including inferior parietal lobule, cingulate and supplementary motor areas, ventral premotor cortex, superior temporal sulcus and primary motor cortex. Critically, inferior parietal lobule and ventral premotor activity was modulated as a function of dancers' ratings of their own ability to perform the observed movements and their motor experience. These data demonstrate that a complex motor resonance can be built de novo over 5 weeks of rehearsal. Furthermore, activity in premotor and parietal areas during action simulation is enhanced by the ability to execute a learned action irrespective of stimulus familiarity or semantic label. (+info)
Mental extrapolation of motion modulates responsiveness to visual stimuli.
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Mental imagery is often considered to be an attentional state. We investigated whether imagining a stimulus in motion involves a corresponding movement of attention. Subjects fixating a central target extrapolated in imagery the motion of a spot that moved along a circular trajectory and then vanished. During imagery, a flash was presented with various backward and forward displacements relative to the direction of the imagined spot. Subjects had to make a saccade to the flash. Saccades were delayed by as much as 50 ms when the flash appeared displaced from the imagined spot, compared to when the flash was presented in its proximity. A similar delay in latency was obtained when subjects responded with a button press. In an "Observation" condition, in which the spot did not disappear, saccade latencies were similarly delayed, although mainly for backward flash displacements. These findings suggest that motion imagery is associated with a movement of visuospatial attention. (+info)
Neural processes underlying memory attribution on a reality-monitoring task.
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A relatively common form of memory distortion arises when individuals must discriminate items they have seen from those they have imagined (reality monitoring). The present fMRI investigation (at 1.5 T) focused on the processes that relate to memory assignment regardless of accuracy (e.g. that correspond with the belief that an item was presented as a picture, regardless of whether that belief is correct). Prior to the scan, participants (n = 16) viewed concrete nouns and formed mental images of the object named. Half of the names were followed by the object's photo. During the scan, participants saw the object names and indicated whether the corresponding photo had been studied. Activity in visual-processing regions (including the precuneus and fusiform gyrus) corresponded with the attribution of an item to a pictorial presentation. In contrast, activity in regions thought to be important for self-referential processing (including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate gyrus) was associated with attribution to a nonpresented source. These neural findings converge with behavioral evidence indicating that individuals use the amount of different types of information retrieved (e.g. perceptual detail, information about cognitive operations) to determine whether an item was imagined or perceived. (+info)
Evaluating the awakening criterion in the definition of nightmares: how certain are people in judging whether a nightmare woke them up?
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There is debate about whether to include in the definition of nightmares a criterion that the imagery or emotions of the nightmare caused the person to wake up. This study investigates whether people believe that they can judge this cause of awakening. 42 participants recorded for 14 nights whether they had a dream, and decided for each dream whether it had or had not woken them. They then rated on a 5-point scale (where 1 = very certain and 5 = very uncertain) how certain they were in their decision of whether or not the dream woke them. Participants' mean certainty was high for decisions that the dream woke them (mean certainty = 1.60), and for very unpleasant dreams this mean certainty that the dream woke them was very high (mean certainty = 1.27). Dreams judged to have caused awakening were found to be more unpleasant than dreams judged not to have caused awakening. Although the inclusion of the awakening criterion did not increase the association of nightmare frequency with anxiety, there may be other advantages in the use of the awakening criterion. (+info)
Auditory neuroscience: activating the cortex without sound.
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Sensory brain areas are usually characterized by their responses to external stimuli; however, neuroimaging studies have now shown that activation of auditory cortex occurs spontaneously and can be induced during silence by stimulus expectancy or mental imagery. (+info)
An enhanced time-frequency-spatial approach for motor imagery classification.
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Human motor imagery (MI) tasks evoke electroencephalogram (EEG) signal changes. The features of these changes appear as subject-specific temporal traces of EEG rhythmic components at specific channels located over the scalp. Accurate classification of MI tasks based upon EEG may lead to a noninvasive brain-computer interface (BCI) to decode and convey intention of human subjects. We have previously proposed two novel methods on time-frequency feature extraction, expression and classification for high-density EEG recordings (Wang and He 2004; Wang, Deng, and He, 2004). In the present study, we refined the above time-frequency-spatial approach and applied it to a one-dimensional "cursor control" BCI experiment with online feedback. Through offline analysis of the collected data, we evaluated the capability of the present refined method in comparison with the original time-frequency-spatial methods. The enhanced performance in terms of classification accuracy was found for the proposed approach, with a mean accuracy rate of 91.1% for two subjects studied. (+info)
Sentence comprehension in autism: thinking in pictures with decreased functional connectivity.
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Comprehending high-imagery sentences like The number eight when rotated 90 degrees looks like a pair of eyeglasses involves the participation and integration of several cortical regions. The linguistic content must be processed to determine what is to be mentally imaged, and then the mental image must be evaluated and related to the sentence. A theory of cortical underconnectivity in autism predicts that the interregional collaboration required between linguistic and imaginal processing in this task would be underserved in autism. This functional MRI study examined brain activation in 12 participants with autism and 13 age- and IQ-matched control participants while they processed sentences with either high- or low-imagery content. The analysis of functional connectivity among cortical regions showed that the language and spatial centres in the participants with autism were not as well synchronized as in controls. In addition to the functional connectivity differences, there was also a group difference in activation. In the processing of low-imagery sentences (e.g. Addition, subtraction and multiplication are all math skills), the use of imagery is not essential to comprehension. Nevertheless, the autism group activated parietal and occipital brain regions associated with imagery for comprehending both the low and high-imagery sentences, suggesting that they were using mental imagery in both conditions. In contrast, the control group showed imagery-related activation primarily in the high-imagery condition. The findings provide further evidence of underintegration of language and imagery in autism (and hence expand the understanding of underconnectivity) but also show that people with autism are more reliant on visualization to support language comprehension. (+info)
The beat goes on: rhythmic modulation of cortical potentials by imagined tapping.
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A frequency analysis was used to tag cortical activity from imagined rhythmic movements. Participants synchronized overt and imagined taps with brief visual stimuli presented at a constant rate, alternating between left and right index fingers. Brain potentials were recorded from across the scalp and topographic maps made of their power at the alternation frequency between left and right taps. Two prominent power foci occurred in each hemisphere for both overt and imagined taps, one over sensorimotor cortex and the other over posterior parietal cortex, with homologous foci in opposite hemispheres arising from oscillations 180 degrees out of phase. These findings demonstrate temporal isomorphism at a neural level between overt and imagined movements and illustrate a new approach to studying covert actions. (+info)