Secular humanism and "scientific psychiatry".
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The Council for Secular Humanism identifies Secular Humanism as a "way of thinking and living" committed to rejecting authoritarian beliefs and embracing "individual freedom and responsibility ... and cooperation." The paradigmatic practices of psychiatry are civil commitment and insanity defense, that is, depriving innocent persons of liberty and excusing guilty persons of their crimes: the consequences of both are confinement in institutions ostensibly devoted to the treatment of mental diseases. Black's Law Dictionary states: "Every confinement of the person is an 'imprisonment,' whether it be in a common prison, or in private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets." Accordingly, I maintain that Secular Humanism is incompatible with the principles and practices of psychiatry. (+info)
The rhetorician's craft, distinctions in science, and political morality.
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In his response to Szasz' Secular Humanism and Scientific Psychiatry, the author considers the use of rhetorical devices in Szasz' work, Szasz' avoidance of acknowledging psychiatry's scientific distinctions, and Szaszian libertarianism versus liberalism. (+info)
Reproductive freedom and risk.
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It is widely recognized that one person's freedom may be limited to prevent harm to another (non-consenting) person. It is curious, therefore, that where a right to reproductive freedom is recognized, there is considerable reticence to limit or override it in cases where reproduction harms those people who are brought into existence. I argue that this is inappropriate. If there should be no right to inflict a harm in non-reproductive contexts then there should be no right to inflict an equivalent harm in reproductive contexts. Because of the long history of bias and arbitrary discrimination in curtailments of reproductive freedom, I suggest how bias might be avoided in deciding how severe a harm must be to defeat a right to reproductive freedom. (+info)
Should health care professionals encourage living kidney donation?
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Living kidney donation provides a promising opportunity in situations where the scarcity of cadaveric kidneys is widely acknowledged. While many patients and their relatives are willing to accept its benefits, others are concerned about living kidney programs; they appear to feel pressured into accepting living kidney transplantations as the only proper option for them. As we studied the attitudes and views of patients and their relatives, we considered just how actively health care professionals should encourage living donation. We argue that active interference in peoples' personal lives is justified - if not obligatory. First, we address the ambiguous ideals of non-directivity and value neutrality in counselling. We describe the main pitfalls implied in these concepts, and conclude that these concepts cannot account for the complex reality of living donation and transplantation. We depict what is required instead as truthful information and context-relative counselling. We then consider professional interference into personal belief systems. We argue that individual convictions are not necessarily strong, stable, or deep. They may be flawed in many ways. In order to justify interference in peoples' personal lives, it is crucial to understand the structure of these convictions. Evidence suggests that both patients and their relatives have attitudes towards living kidney donation that are often open to change and, accordingly, can be influenced. We show how ethical theories can account for this reality and can help us to discern between justified and unjustified interference. We refer to Stephen Toulmin's model of the structure of logical argument, the Rawlsian model of reflective equilibrium, and Thomas Nagel's representation of the particularistic position. (+info)
Transhumanism, medical technology and slippery slopes.
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In this article, transhumanism is considered to be a quasi-medical ideology that seeks to promote a variety of therapeutic and human-enhancing aims. Moderate conceptions are distinguished from strong conceptions of transhumanism and the strong conceptions were found to be more problematic than the moderate ones. A particular critique of Bostrom's defence of transhumanism is presented. Various forms of slippery slope arguments that may be used for and against transhumanism are discussed and one particular criticism, moral arbitrariness, that undermines both weak and strong transhumanism is highlighted. (+info)
Public health and human values.
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The ends and means of public health activities are suggested to be at odds with the values held by human individuals and communities. Although promoting longer lives in better health for all seems like an endeavour that is obviously acceptable, it can be challenged by equally self-evident appeals to autonomy, happiness, integrity and liberty, among other values. The result is that people's actual concerns are not always adequately dealt with by public health measures and assurances. (+info)
Expressing freedom and taking liberties: the paradoxes of aberrant science.
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Complete freedom does not exist, despite people's preparedness to die for it. Scientific freedom is much defended and yet much misunderstood. Scientists have limits imposed on their freedom by the disciplines and discourse communities in which they place themselves. Freedom within these socially constructed constraints needs to be distinguished from taking liberties with the rules and practices that make up these constraints, and validate the activities of special groups within society. Scientists (and the public) perceive taking liberties with science's rules and practices as aberrant science, and they often react punitively. Aberrant science can be broadly examined under four headings: wicked science, naughty science, dysfunctional science, and ideologically unacceptable science. When we examine examples of perceived aberrant science, we find that these categories of "misconduct" are connected and often confused. Scientific freedom needs to be redefined with due regard to current understandings of scientists as human beings facing powerful social pressures to deliver results of a particular kind. (+info)
Concepts of "person" and "liberty," and their implications to our fading notions of autonomy.
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It is commonly held that respect for autonomy is one of the most important principles in medical ethics. However, there are a number of interpretations as to what that respect actually entails in practice and a number of constraints have been suggested even on our self-regarding choices. These limits are often justified in the name of autonomy. In this paper, it is argued that these different interpretations can be explained and understood by looking at the discussion from the viewpoints of positive and negative liberty and the various notions of a "person" that lay beneath. It will be shown how all the appeals to positive liberty presuppose a particular value system and are therefore problematic in multicultural societies. (+info)