Multiple human exposures to a rabid bear cub at a petting zoo and barnwarming--Iowa, August 1999.
(25/1608)
On August 27, 1999, a black bear cub, approximately 5-6 months old, died after several hours of acute central nervous system symptoms; preliminary test results available on August 28 indicated the bear had rabies. The bear was part of the Swenson's Wild Midwest Exotic Petting Zoo in Clermont, Iowa (northeastern Iowa). At the petting zoo, visitors fed, wrestled, and may have been nipped by the bear. The bear also was taken to an August 14 barnwarming at the Tharp barn in Holy Cross, Iowa (eastern Iowa), where it reportedly nipped people. An estimated 400 people from 10 states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and Australia had contact with the bear cub at either the petting zoo or the barnwarming during the 28 days before its death, during which the bear may have transmitted rabies virus. (+info)
African horse sickness in Portugal: a successful eradication programme.
(27/1608)
African horse sickness (AHS) was diagnosed for the first time in southern Portugal in autumn 1989, following outbreaks in Spain. AHS virus presence was confirmed by virus isolation and serotyping. An eradication campaign with four sanitary zones was set up by Central Veterinary Services in close collaboration with private organizations. Vaccination began on 6 October. In February 1990, vaccination was extended to all Portuguese equines (170000 animals). There were 137 outbreaks on 104 farms: 206 of the equidae present died (16%) or were slaughtered (14%); 81.5% were horses, 10.7% were donkeys and 7.8% were mules. Clinical AHS occurred more frequently in horses than donkeys and mules. In the vaccinated population, 82 animals (62.2% horses and 37.8% mules and donkeys), died or were slaughtered due to suspected or confirmed AHS. One year after ending vaccination, December 1991, Portugal was declared free of AHS. Cost of eradication was US$1955513 (US$11.5/Portuguese equine). (+info)
Chlamydia transmission: concurrency, reproduction number, and the epidemic trajectory.
(28/1608)
To identify factors that influence individual and group transmission of Chlamydia, the authors conducted community-wide contact tracing of chlamydia cases in Colorado Springs, Colorado, from mid-1996 to mid-1997. Case patients identified persons with whom they had had contact during the 6 months preceding diagnosis; contacts were actively sought and offered DNA amplification testing. Sexual contact networks were used to identify "source cases" and "spread cases," permitting estimation of the basic reproduction number (R0) for individuals and groups. Network and epidemiologic factors influencing R0 were assessed using univariate and multivariate procedures. Of 1,309 case patients, 1,131 (86%) were interviewed, and 2,409 contacts were identified. The 1,131 interviewed cases yielded 623.9 computed spread cases, for an overall R0 of 0.55. Few subgroups analyzed yielded a mean R0 exceeding unity-an observation in keeping with routine surveillance information which suggests that chlamydia incidence is declining in Colorado Springs. Concurrency, a network measure of simultaneous partnerships, was the most powerful predictor of transmission. Direct estimation of basic reproduction numbers for chlamydia using contact tracing techniques is feasible and can produce useful data with which to prioritize control efforts, evaluate interventions, and gauge the place of chlamydia on the epidemic continuum. (+info)
Guidelines for surveillance, prevention, and control of West Nile virus infection--United States.
(29/1608)
The introduction of West Nile (WN) virus in the northeastern United States during the summer and fall of 1999 raised the issue of preparedness of public health agencies to handle sporadic and outbreak-associated vector-borne diseases. In many local and state health departments, vector-borne disease capacity has diminished. Because it is unknown whether the virus can persist over the winter, whether it has already or will spread to new geographic locations, and the public health and animal health implications of this introduction, it is important to establish proactive laboratory-based surveillance and prevention and control programs to limit the impact of the virus in the United States. On November 8 and 9, 1999, CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) cosponsored a meeting of experts representing a wide range of disciplines to review the outbreak and to provide input and guidance on the programs that should be developed to monitor WN virus activity and to prevent future outbreaks of disease. This report summarizes the guidelines established during this meeting. (+info)
Delayed immunization against vaccine preventable diseases--factors responsible among children under 5 years of age.
(30/1608)
In the present case-control study, out of the the eleven risk factors of delayed immunization, only seven, namely family size, sex, number of children < 5 years, material education, paternal education, distance from health centre and low socio-economic status were found to be significantly associated. The common causes for delayed immunization were negligence on part of parents, unawareness about the use of vaccine and sickness of child. Thus, health education of the parents is recommended. (+info)
Epidemiological studies on the 1967-1968 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic: the reporting of suspected disease.
(31/1608)
From an analysis of the telephone reports in ten FMD Control Centres in the West Midlands, the veterinary officers' reports on each outbreak, the farm patrol reports and the daily number of outbreaks announced on the 17.50 h B.B.C. T.V. News, it would appear that the reporting of suspected outbreaks was indirectly related to the local disease activity. Private veterinary practitioners reported older cases of FMD at the beginning and end of the epidemic than in the middle. (+info)
Rumors of disease in the global village: outbreak verification.
(32/1608)
Emerging infectious diseases and the growth of information technology have produced new demands and possibilities for disease surveillance and response. Increasing numbers of outbreak reports must be assessed rapidly so that control efforts can be initiated and unsubstantiated reports can be identified to protect countries from unnecessary economic damage. The World Health Organization has set up a process for timely outbreak verification to convert large amounts of data into accurate information for suitable action. We describe the context and processes of outbreak verification and information dissemination. (+info)