Reliable medically assisted sex selection which does not involve abortion or infanticide has recently become available, and has been used for non-medical reasons. This raises questions about the morality of sex selection for non-medical reasons. But reasonable people continue to disagree about the answers to these questions. So another set of questions is about what the law should be on medically assisted sex selection for non-medical reasons in the face of reasonable disagreement about the morality of sex selection. This paper sketches a way of thinking about what the law should be, and concludes, contrary to what the law is in many places, that medically assisted sex selection for non-medical reasons ought to be legal. (+info)
The Council of Europe's first Symposium on Bioethics: Strasbourg, Dec 5-7 1989.
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This symposium discussed bioethics teaching, research and documentation and also research ethics committees. An international convention for the protection of the integrity of the human body was called for, as was a new European Committee on Ethics. 'The genetic impact' was a major preoccupation of the symposium. (+info)
Medical ethics: a brief response to Seedhouse.
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Medical ethics is that branch of applied philosophy which considers issues of values raised by medical practice, and should not be equated with 'principlism'. Clarification of facts/values distinctions is an important part of this work. The notion that medical philosophy can flourish in the hands of medical 'generalists' without specialist philosophers, is misguided. Both must work together to promote right reason and right action in medical education and practice. (+info)
Reply to Ann Bradshaw.
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My original paper suggested that an ethics of care which failed to specify how, and about what, to care would be devoid of normative and descriptive content. Bradshaw's approach provides such a specification and is, therefore, not devoid of such content. However, as all ethical approaches suggest something about the 'what' and 'how' of care, they are all 'ethics of care' in this broader sense. This reinforces rather than undermines my original conclusion. Furthermore, Bradshaw's 'ethics of care' has philosophical and historical problems which I outline. (+info)
A reply to Professor Seedhouse.
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This brief reply gives a few references and clarifies some points in order to emphasize that a number of Professor Seedhouse's assertions are debatable and that his criticism of slovenly scholarship and his unbridled ad hominem argumentation are out of place and easily refuted. (+info)
Ethics and family practice: some modern dilemmas.
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Ethical dilemmas in family practice have increased in frequency and complexity as both the potential benefit and the potential harm of medical treatments have increased. All physicians must be aware of moral issues relating to medicine. Family physicians commonly face ethical problems concerning the patient with diminished autonomy; the right to refuse treatment; allocation of resources; informed consent; surrogate consent (for children, for the incompetent, and for those with diminished autonomy); and the appropriate level of aggressiveness in treatment. (+info)
Ethics and the Alberta family physician.
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Ethics, the science of moral decision making, is a part of every medical decision, though little consideration is given to this fact in relation to the mundane affairs of everyday practice. Physicians, for the most part, have received little formal instruction in ethics, and often make moral decisions in an ;intutive' way. In this article, the authors review the results of a study they conducted, in which they attempted to determine the level of education in ethical decision making that physicians practising in Alberta have received, as well as the physicians' knowledge of the Hippocratic Oath and the Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics. (+info)