People have concerns, and ethicists often respond to them with philosophical arguments. But can conceptual constructions properly address fears and anxieties? It is argued in this paper that while it is possible to voice, clarify, create and-to a certain extent-tackle concerns by arguments, more concrete practices, choices, and actions are normally needed to produce proper responses to people's worries. While logical inconsistencies and empirical errors can legitimately be exposed by arguments, the situation is considerably less clear when it comes to moral, cultural, and emotional norms, values, and expectations. (+info)
More on parental living liver donation for children with fulminant hepatic failure: addressing concerns about competing interests, coercion, consent and balancing acts.
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Parental living liver donation for children with fulminant hepatic failure raises complex ethical issues. According to a recent editorial in this journal, these include contradictory interests, the possibility of coercion and compromised consent and the need to balance the risks to the donor against the potential benefits for the recipient. Here I argue that in this setting, interests are often aligned rather than conflicted, that coercion of parental donors is rare, that consent may sometimes be valid even when it is not fully informed and that the correct balance to consider is the relative weights of risks and benefits for the donor. I conclude that living liver donation by parents of children with fulminant hepatic failure is consistent with societal norms of parental behavior, ethically acceptable and should be permitted regardless of the efficiency of the deceased donor organ recovery program. (+info)
Ethical considerations in the application of preconditioning to solid organ transplantation.
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The shortage of organs for transplantation has led researchers to look for new techniques to expand the donor pool. Preconditioning strategies have the potential to protect organs from transplant associated injury or may improve the function of substandard organs so that they become suitable for transplantation. Translating this type of technology to the clinical setting raises ethical issues, particularly relating to the deceased donor. It is important that society has the opportunity to discuss the issues raised by implementation of preconditioning strategies before they are implemented rather than as a reaction to them. (+info)
Making sense of dignity.
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In this review of Leon Kass's Life, liberty and the defense of dignity and Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword's Human dignity in bioethics and biolaw. I consider the prospects for a theory of dignity as a basis for bioethics research. I argue that dignity theories are worth exploring in more detail, but that research needs to consider both "antitheory" accounts of the language of bioethics, and to give more weight to accounts of dignity as an outcome of holding positive liberties and as something that has a psychological dimension. (+info)
Evidence-based ethics? On evidence-based practice and the "empirical turn" from normative bioethics.
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BACKGROUND: The increase in empirical methods of research in bioethics over the last two decades is typically perceived as a welcomed broadening of the discipline, with increased integration of social and life scientists into the field and ethics consultants into the clinical setting, however it also represents a loss of confidence in the typical normative and analytic methods of bioethics. DISCUSSION: The recent incipiency of "Evidence-Based Ethics" attests to this phenomenon and should be rejected as a solution to the current ambivalence toward the normative resolution of moral problems in a pluralistic society. While "evidence-based" is typically read in medicine and other life and social sciences as the empirically-adequate standard of reasonable practice and a means for increasing certainty, I propose that the evidence-based movement in fact gains consensus by displacing normative discourse with aggregate or statistically-derived empirical evidence as the "bottom line". Therefore, along with wavering on the fact/value distinction, evidence-based ethics threatens bioethics' normative mandate. The appeal of the evidence-based approach is that it offers a means of negotiating the demands of moral pluralism. Rather than appealing to explicit values that are likely not shared by all, "the evidence" is proposed to adjudicate between competing claims. Quantified measures are notably more "neutral" and democratic than liberal markers like "species normal functioning". Yet the positivist notion that claims stand or fall in light of the evidence is untenable; furthermore, the legacy of positivism entails the quieting of empirically non-verifiable (or at least non-falsifiable) considerations like moral claims and judgments. As a result, evidence-based ethics proposes to operate with the implicit normativity that accompanies the production and presentation of all biomedical and scientific facts unchecked. SUMMARY: The "empirical turn" in bioethics signals a need for reconsideration of the methods used for moral evaluation and resolution, however the options should not include obscuring normative content by seemingly neutral technical measure. (+info)
International perspectives on engaging the public in neuroethics.
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With an ever-increasing understanding of the brain mechanisms associated with core human attributes and values, there is an increasing public interest in the results of neuroscience research and the ways in which that new knowledge will be used. Here, we present perspectives on engaging the public on these issues on an international scale, the role of the media, and prospects for the new field of neuroethics as both a focus and a driver of these efforts. (+info)
Bioethics and health and human rights: a critical view.
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Recent decades have seen the emergence of two new fields of inquiry into ethical issues in medicine. These are the fields of bioethics and of health and human rights. In this critical review of these fields, the author argues that bioethics, partly because it has been construed so broadly, suffers from quality control problems. The author also argues that the field of health and human rights is superfluous because it does nothing that cannot be done by either bioethics of the law. (+info)
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: legal and ethical aspects.
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Attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) remains a controversial disorder, despite it now being a well validated clinical diagnosis. Ethical and legal issues are important in determining how doctors should behave in offering a diagnosis or treatment that may generate strong and unpredictable reactions from children, their families, or other agencies. A model for routine ethical practice was proposed, based on three sets of assumptions. Firstly, that ethical practice is consistent with the four principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and respect for autonomy. Secondly, ethical concerns lead to legal processes, whose task is to ensure ethical practice. Thirdly, that we are working in the interests of our patients. Current relevant literature was organised in terms of this model, and recommendations for practice derived from it. Though there is no general ethical problem regarding either the routine diagnosis or treatment of ADHD, ethical difficulties surround some special cases, especially when doctors are working in conjunction with other agencies or coping with non-medical frameworks. Particular care needs to be taken with confidentiality and consent, the limits of which are currently confused. The model worked well with everyday ethical problems, though more difficult cases required careful individual scrutiny. (+info)