The face of women's health: Helen Rodriguez-Trias.
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The American Public Health Association has announced that it will establish an award in the name of Helen Rodriguez-Trias, MD, its first Latina president, who died of lung cancer on December 27, 2001 [corrected]. Rodriguez-Trias, a nationally known advocate for underserved communities, was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal by President Clinton in January 2001 for her work on behalf of children, women, people with AIDS, and the poor. This article is based on a dialogue with Rodriguez-Trias that began in September 2001 and ended December 12, 2001. (+info)
Thomson, the right to life, and partial birth abortion or two MULES for Sister Sarah.
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In this paper, I argue that Thomson's famous attempt to reconcile the fetus's putative right to life with robust abortion rights is not tenable. Given her view, whether or not an abortion violates the fetus's right to life depends on the abortion procedure utilised. And I argue that Thomson's view implies that any late term abortion that involves feticide is impermissible. In particular, this would rule out the partial birth abortion technique which has been so controversial of late. (+info)
Two challenges to the double effect doctrine: euthanasia and abortion.
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The validity of the double effect doctrine is examined in euthanasia and abortion. In these two situations killing is a method of treatment. It is argued that the doctrine cannot apply to the care of the dying. Firstly, doctors are obliged to harm patients in order to do good to them. Secondly, patients should make their own value judgments about being mutilated or killed. Thirdly, there is little intuitive moral difference between direct and indirect killing. Nor can the doctrine apply to abortion. Doctors kill fetuses as a means of treating the mother. They also kill them as an inevitable side effect of other treatment. Drawing a moral distinction between the direct and the indirect killing gives counterintuitive results. It is suggested that pragmatic rules, not ethics, govern practices around euthanasia and cause it to be more restricted than abortion. (+info)
Evidence of the Royal College of General Practitioners to the Select Committee of Parliament on the Abortion (Amendment) Bill.
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The Royal College of General Practitioners is, of course, fully aware that the regulation of the conditions for abortion is inevitably difficult and complex and that opinions are often difficult to reconcile.Nevertheless, the College has been able to establish the grave concern of many of its members at the proposals outlined in this Bill. The College has not received one single letter in support of the Abortion (Amendment) Bill.The College notes that the Lane Committee (1974) carried out a very full and detailed review of the working of the Abortion Act and published its view only last year. The College notes that the Lane Committee took evidence from those with every shade of opinion, examined in detail virtually every published scientific report on abortion in this country, and, furthermore, commissioned and published specific evidence about the working of the 1967 Abortion Act.The College notes that the Lane Committee contained members, in addition to general practitioners, who were lawyers, administrative medical officers, psychiatrists, gynaecologists, social workers, and women representing the public, and that its work took about three years to carry out.The Royal College of General Practitioners endorses the work of the Lane Committee and therefore recommends that the recommendations of that Committee should be implemented instead of the proposals in the Abortion (Amendment) Bill. (+info)
A future like ours revisited.
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It is claimed by the future like ours anti-abortion argument that since killing adult humans is wrong because it deprives them of a future of value and the fetus has a future of value, killing fetuses is wrong in the same way that killing adult human beings is wrong. In The morality of abortion and the deprivation of futures (this journal, April 2000) I argued that the persuasive power of this argument rests upon an equivocation on the term "future of value". If the expression means "a potential future of value" then the moral claim is implausible because people do not in general have rights to what they need to fulfill their potential; if the expression means "self-represented future of value" then the argument fails because the fetus does not represent its future. Under no interpretation is the argument sound. In Deprivations, futures and the wrongness of killing (this journal, December 2001) Donald Marquis, author of the future like ours argument, responds at length to this objection. In the present essay the focus of the debate shifts to the proper interpretation of the right not to be killed. Donald Marquis argues that this liberty right entails the welfare right to the means necessary to sustain life; I argue that the right not to be killed does not entail unlimited welfare rights. On Marquis's view, the right not to be killed confers upon the fetus the right to whatever it takes to sustain life; on the view I defend, the right not to be killed does not confer upon the fetus or anyone else the right to another person's body. On Marquis's view, abortion is almost never permissible; on my view abortion is almost always permissible. (+info)
Present self-represented futures of value are a reason for the wrongness of killing.
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In Marquis's recent paper he has not satisfactorily shown that killing does not adversely affect the victim's present self-represented desires for their future. Marquis is correct in believing life and death are distinct, but living and dying are not. In fact, to use a well-known saying, "the second we are born we start to die". During the process of dying, whether it be long as in over our lifetime or short as in as we are being killed, there comes a point when the present realistic desires we have we know will never be satisfied. This is why killing can be wrong. This would imply killing an unconscious person, infant, or fetus cannot be wrong. But such killing can be wrong, despite the person killed not experiencing the desire not to be killed as he was dying. Killing can be wrong because others can have a present self-represented desire for that person not to be killed to have been killed. If this line of reasoning is correct, then the "best interests" principle often applied to life and death considerations regarding unconscious persons, infants, and fetuses, is invalid, as such human beings do not have present desires. All that matters is what relevant others rationally desire, after being informed of the facts and the consequences, for that unconscious person, infant or fetus. (+info)
A defence of the potential future of value theory.
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In this issue of the journal Mark Brown has offered a new argument against my potential future of value theory. I argue that even though the premises of this new argument are far more defensible than the premises of his old argument, the new argument does not show that the potential future of value theory of the wrongness of killing is false. If the considerations to which Brown appeals are used, not to show that the potential future of value theory is false, but to show that abortion is morally permissible, they are also unsuccessful. I also argue that Brown's clarified self-represented future of value account and Simon Parsons's account of the wrongness of killing are both subject to major difficulties. Finally, I show, in an appendix, that Brown's assertion that my discussion of his views suffers from major logical errors is false. (+info)
Commentary on Skene and Parker: the role of a church (or other ideologically based interest group) in developing the law--a plea for ethereal intervention.
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This paper discusses the provocative views of Skene and Parker as to the role of religious or other ideologically based interest groups in law and policy making. We draw distinctions between doctrine and prejudice and between argument and ideology which we trust take the debate further. Finally we recommend an ethereal, democratic, and populist partial solution. (+info)