A number of developments in the medical field have changed the debate about the ethics of abortion. These developments include: advances in fetal physiology, the increase in neonatal intensive care and the survival rates of premature infants. This paper discusses the idea of selective termination and the effects that these decisions have on disabled people of today. It presents a critique of the counselling services that are provided for the parents of a disabled fetus and discusses how this is viewed from a social perspective. The article ends with an argument that the mother deserves to be autonomous in the decision of abortion. The easiest and most fair way to develop her autonomy is to consider the relationship between a professional and a mother as an expert-expert relationship. Here both parties are considered experts in diagnostic information, treatment options, possibilities, and their history, family roots, philosophy and way of life, respectively. (+info)
Screening for disability: a eugenic pursuit?
(10/83)
This article is written in response to the idea that selective termination may be eugenic. It points out that a mixture of motives and goals may inform screening programmes and selective termination for fetal abnormality without the intention being "eugenic". The paper locates modern genetics within the tradition of humanist medicine by suggesting that parents who choose to terminate a pregnancy because of fetal abnormalities are not making moral judgments about those who are living with these abnormalities already. Rather they are making judgments about their own lives and the lives of their children in relation to this genetic disorder. It concludes by introducing several caveats about the counselling that parents receive after the results of the testing and suggests that counselling inevitably contains a directive element because of the nature of the information covered. (+info)
Unfinished feticide: the ethical problems.
(11/83)
Dr. Jansen's paper raises three main issues. The one with which he himself is most concerned is the question of which methods of abortion are ethically right, and whether methods which risk the birth of a damaged baby are wrong. But there are two others: first, how the (originally unintended) birth of a live but damaged child alters the moral situation, and secondly, whether the overcoming of sterility by inducing a multiple pregnancy in which some of the fetuses have to be killed in order for any of them to survive is at all morally acceptable. (+info)
Unfinished feticide: a legal commentary.
(12/83)
Jansen expresses concern as to the legal implications of both selective reduction of pregnancy and unsuccessful attempts at termination of pregnancy using mifepristone. This commentary examines the legality of both procedures and concludes that Jansen is over-optimistic in his belief that neither procedure is likely to fall foul of the criminal laws on induced abortion. By contrast his anxieties about civil liability arising from the subsequent live birth of a damaged infant are, it is suggested, unnecessarily pessimistic. Such an action is most unlikely to succeed if brought by the infant herself and any claim on the part of the mother will normally be dependent on proof of negligence. The commentary focusses on the law in England with relevant references to other common law jurisdictions. (+info)
Response to: What counts as success in genetic counselling?
(13/83)
Clinical genetics encompasses a wider range of activities than discussion of reproductive risks and options. Hence, it is possible for a clinical geneticist to reduce suffering associated with genetic disease without aiming to reduce the birth incidence of such diseases. Simple cost-benefit analyses of genetic-screening programmes are unacceptable; more sophisticated analyses of this type have been devised but entail internal inconsistencies and do not seem to result in changed clinical practice. The secondary effects of screening programmes must be assessed before they can be properly evaluated, including the inadvertent diagnosis of unsought conditions, and the wider social effects of the programmes on those with mental handicap. This has implications for the range of prenatal tests that should be made available. While autonomy must be fully respected, it cannot itself constitute a goal of clinical genetics. The evaluation of these services requires interdepartmental comparisons of workload, and quality judgements of clients and peers. (+info)