Second-order belief attribution in Williams syndrome: intact or impaired?
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Second-order mental state attribution in a group of children with Williams syndrome was investigated. The children were compared to age, IQ, and language-matched groups of children with Prader-Willi syndrome or nonspecific mental retardation. Participants were given two trials of a second-order reasoning task. No significant differences between the Williams syndrome and Prader-Willi or mentally retarded groups on any of the test questions were found. Results contrast with the view that individuals with Williams syndrome have an intact theory of mind and suggest that in their attributions of second-order mental states, children with Williams syndrome perform no better than do other groups of children with mental retardation. (+info)
Addiction: part II. Identification and management of the drug-seeking patient.
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The medications most often implicated in prescription drug abuse are opioid analgesics, sedative-hypnotics and stimulants. Patients with acute or chronic pain, anxiety disorders and attention-deficit disorder are at increased risk of addiction comorbidity. It is important to ask patients about their substance-use history, including alcohol, illicit drugs and prescription drugs. Patients who abuse prescription drugs may exhibit certain patterns, such as escalating use, drug-seeking behavior and doctor shopping. A basic clinical survival skill in situations in which patients exert pressure on the physician to obtain a prescription drug is to say "no" and stick with it. Physicians who overprescribe can be characterized by the four "Ds"-dated, duped, dishonest and disabled. Maintaining a current knowledge base, documenting the decisions that guide the treatment process and seeking consultation are important risk-management strategies that improve clinical care and outcomes. (+info)
Justified deception? The single blind placebo in drug research.
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"Run-in" and "washout" periods involving the withholding of medication are widely used in drug research trials in pursuit of both patient safety and scientific reliability. Such no-medication periods can be justified ethically provided that they are apparent to patients, who can thereby properly consent to undergoing them. Less widespread, but still common, is the practice of "single blinding" no-medication periods, concealing them from patients by means of placebo. Whilst all placebos involve a measure of concealment, their use is typically justified in drug research trials (i) by their preserving the uncertainty generated by the random allocation of different treatments within a drug trial; and (ii) by the researchers openly declaring both the randomisation process and the chances of receiving placebo. In the single blind placebo "run-in" or "washout", neither of these conditions is met. This paper considers three possible defences of the practice of using single blind placebo "run-ins" or "washouts" and finds them all to fail; the practice appears ethically unjustified. (+info)
A pill in the sandwich: covert medication in food and drink.
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The covert administration of medicines in food and drink has been condemned by some and condoned by others. We used questionnaires to ascertain the views of people caring for patients with dementia in institutions and in the community. In 24 (71%) of 34 residential, nursing and inpatient units in south-east England, the respondent said that medicines were sometimes given in this way. It was often done secretly and without discussion, probably for fear of professional retribution. Few institutions had a formal policy on the matter. Of 50 people caring for demented patients in the community, 48 (96%) thought the practice sometimes justifiable, but 47 believed that doctors should consult with carers before deciding. Even if, as most carers and some authorities believe, covert medication can be justified, the poor recording and secrecy surrounding the practice in institutions are cause for concern. (+info)
Intuitions, principles and consequences.
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Some approaches to the assessment of moral intuitions are discussed. The controlled ethical trial isolates a moral issue from confounding factors and thereby clarifies what a person's intuition actually is. Casuistic reasoning from situations, where intuitions are clear, suggests or modifies principles, which can then help to make decisions in situations where intuitions are unclear. When intuitions are defended by a supporting principle, that principle can be tested by finding extreme cases, in which it is counterintuitive to follow the principle. An approach to the resolution of conflict between valid moral principles, specifically the utilitarian and justice principles, is considered. It is argued that even those who justify intuitions by a priori principles are often obliged to modify or support their principles by resort to the consideration of consequences. (+info)
Medicine, lies and deceptions.
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This article offers a qualified defence of the view that there is a moral difference between telling lies to one's patients, and deceiving them without lying. However, I take issue with certain arguments offered by Jennifer Jackson in support of the same conclusion. In particular, I challenge her claim that to deny that there is such a moral difference makes sense only within a utilitarian framework, and I cast doubt on the aptness of some of her examples of non-lying deception. But I argue that lies have a greater tendency to damage trust than does non-lying deception, and suggest that since many doctors do believe there is a moral boundary between the two types of deception, encouraging them to violate that boundary may have adverse general effects on their moral sensibilities. (+info)
Comments on an obstructed death -- a case conference revisited: commentary 1.
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The paper comments on Scott Dunbar's "An obstructed death and medical ethics," arguing contra Dunbar that we should not view truth-telling to the terminally ill as primarily governed by principles of veracity and respect for autonomy. All such rules are of limited value in medical ethics. We should instead turn to an ethics deriving from the centrality of moral relationships and virtues. A brief analysis of the connections between moral relationships and moral rules is offered. Such an ethics would lower the value that philosophical fashion places on truth-telling and autonomy and leave decisions about truth-telling and the terminally ill more dependent on the circumstances of particular cases. (+info)
An obstructed death and medical ethics -- a case conference revisited: commentary 2.
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The dilemma of whether or not a doctor should tell a patient dying of cancer the truth remains a difficult one, as the disagreement between the two previous writers shows. One favours giving priority to patient autonomy, the other feels the doctor's duty of beneficence should be the overriding principle governing such decisions. To this contributor it seems both approaches have something to offer. By being sensitive to what and how much the patient wishes to know and by learning from the insights provided by the study of medical ethics, doctors can learn how to make better moral decisions in this and in other areas. Both lying and truth-telling carry risks of harm to the patient. Learning to work with and balance these risks is part of clinical practice. So is minimising risks by clear thinking. (+info)