Paying for graduate medical education: the debate goes on.
(1/11)
The debate over Medicare payments for graduate medical education has been conducted under the premise that such payments cover the added costs of training. Standard economic theory suggests that residents bear the costs of their training, implying that the additional costs of teaching hospitals are not attributable to training per se but to some combination of a different patient care product, unmeasured case-mix differences, and the costs of clinical research. As a result, payment for the additional patient care costs at teaching hospitals should come from the Medicare trust fund; any subsidies for training should come from general revenues. (+info)
Medicare physician payment changes: impact on physicians and beneficiaries.
(2/11)
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 generally reduced Medicare payments for surgical services while increasing them for other services. Concern about implications of these fee reductions prompted the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to sponsor a national survey of physicians to learn their views on Medicare payment and whether access to care has changed for Medicare beneficiaries. Results suggest that beneficiaries' access to care has not declined. While physicians are concerned about Medicare reimbursement, they are more concerned about reimbursement from managed care plans and Medicaid. Continued monitoring will be important to detect any emerging access problems accompanying upcoming payment reductions. (+info)
Having it all: national benefit equity and local payment parity in Medicare.
(3/11)
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has identified two important problems with the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program: nationwide geographic inequity in government-financed benefits, and unequal government payments for M+C plans versus fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare in the same market area. MedPAC concludes that both problems cannot be solved simultaneously. We argue that both problems could be solved if Congress discontinued its policy of underwriting the cost of FFS Medicare. Instead, Congress should define a national entitlement benefit package and have all health plans submit bids on the package in each market area. The government's premium contribution should be equal to the lowest bid submitted by a qualified health plan in each market area. The contribution could be adjusted for health risk, the special obligations of FFS Medicare, and welfare enhancements associated with FFS Medicare that are valued by both beneficiaries and taxpayers but unrelated to beneficiaries' health status. (+info)
Medicare+Choice: current role and near-term prospects.
(4/11)
With the enactment of the Balanced Budget Act in 1997, the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program has been beset by plan withdrawals and declining enrollment. Despite this, M+C provides coverage to more than 12 percent of the Medicare population, a group that is disproportionately poor and minority. Under current law and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) M+C reform option, M+C enrollment will decline by one million over the next three years, while the new Bush administration proposal would stabilize program enrollment. If M+C were eliminated, nearly a third of its members would end up in traditional Medicare without any additional coverage, and 18 percent would enroll in Medicaid. (+info)
Shortcomings in Medicare bonus payments for physicians in underserved areas.
(5/11)
This study examines trends in Medicare spending for basic payments and bonus payments for physician services provided to beneficiaries residing in nonmetropolitan counties. For our analysis, we used Medicare Part B physician/supplier claims data for 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. Payments under the congressionally mandated bonus payment program acccounted for less than 1 percent of expenditures for physician services in nonmetropolitan, underserved counties. Physician payments increased from 1992 to 1998, while bonus payments increased through 1996 but then declined by 13 percent by 1998. The share of bonus payments to primary care physicians declined throughout the decade, but the share for primary care services increased. (+info)
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the financial health of teaching hospitals.
(6/11)
BACKGROUND: We wanted to evaluate the most recent, complete data related to the specific effects of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 relative to the overall financial health of teaching hospitals. We also define cost report variables and calculations necessary for continued impact monitoring. METHODS: We undertook a descriptive analysis of hospital cost report variables for 1996, 1998, and 1999, using simple calculations of total, Medicare, prospective payment system, graduate medical education (GME), and bad debt margins, as well as the proportion with negative total operating margins. RESULTS: Nearly 35% of teaching hospitals had negative operating margins in 1999. Teaching hospital total margins fell by nearly 50% between 1996 and 1999, while Medicare margins remained relatively stable. GME margins have fallen by nearly 24%, however, even as reported education costs have risen by nearly 12%. Medicare + Choice GME payments were less than 10% of those projected. CONCLUSIONS: Teaching hospitals realized deep cuts in profitability between 1996 and 1999; however, these cuts were not entirely attributable to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Medicare payments remain an important financial cushion for teaching hospitals, more than one third of which operated in the red. The role of Medicare in supporting GME has been substantially reduced and needs special attention in the overall debate. Medicare + Choice support of the medical education enterprise is 90% less than baseline projections and should be thoroughly investigated. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, which has a critical role in evaluating the effects of Medicare policy changes, should be more transparent in its methods. (+info)
Pay-for-performance: the MedPAC perspective.
(7/11)
Medicare payment systems are neutral and sometimes negative toward quality of care. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has recommended that Congress build incentives for quality into Medicare's payment systems for hospitals, physicians, home health agencies, facilities that treat dialysis patients, and Medicare Advantage plans. In this Commentary we describe the rationale for the recommendations, criteria for determining which settings are ready, program design principles, and potential measures. (+info)
Snapshot of hospital quality reporting and pay-for-performance under Medicare.
(8/11)
This paper examines the impact that Medicare pay-for-performance (P4P) might have upon hospital payment. It uses the initial two quarters of a national quality database to model financial gains or losses using the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration rules, as well as the P4P approach recommended by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). Findings reveal variation among all types of hospitals and across all measures within each of the three conditions studied: heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. Initially, hospitals' financial gains and losses likely will be marginal using the Premier demonstration payment rules and somewhat larger under the MedPAC recommendations as modeled. (+info)