(17/97) Tobacco industry efforts to defeat the occupational safety and health administration indoor air quality rule.

OBJECTIVES: We describe tobacco industry strategies to defeat the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Indoor Air Quality rule and the implementation of those strategies. METHODS: We analyzed tobacco industry documents, public commentary on, and media coverage of the OSHA rule. RESULTS: The tobacco industry had 5 strategies: (1) maintain scientific debate about the basis of the rule, (2) delay deliberation on the rule, (3) redefine the scope of the rule, (4) recruit and assist labor and business organizations in opposing the rule, and (5) increase media coverage of the tobacco industry position. The tobacco industry successfully implemented all 5 strategies. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that regulatory authorities must take into account the source, motivation, and validity of arguments used in the regulatory process in order to make accurately informed decisions.  (+info)

(18/97) Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health.

OBJECTIVE: To demonstrate that Philip Morris and British American Tobacco Company attempted to initiate a wide ranging campaign to undermine the success of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992. DATA SOURCES: Publicly available tobacco industry documents housed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; Guilford, UK; on-line document websites; and telephone interviews with informed parties. STUDY SELECTION: Those documents determined to be relevant to the companies' campaigns against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health. DATA EXTRACTION: Revision of chapter VIII of the July 2000 WHO report by a committee of experts, entitled: Tobacco company strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World Health Organization: report of the committee of experts on tobacco industry documents. DATA SYNTHESIS: Internal documents describe proposed media and science orientated campaigns developed by BAT, Philip Morris, and their consultants to divert attention away from the conference. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: This work shows that the tobacco industry has the resources and vested interest to combat perceived threats in its regional operating markets, in this case its Latin American market. It is important for the worldwide public heath community to become aware of the numerous ways in which the tobacco industry and its front groups can work against international tobacco control meetings, even including the manipulation of or working with other public health groups to oppose tobacco control efforts. Future world conference planners and participants should be aware that the tobacco industry is likely to continue to employ such methodology. There is no reason to think that the industry is paying less attention to such conferences in the present or future. Rather, it is likely the industry will adopt and expand strategies that were successful while abandoning those that were not effective. Required disclosure of financial support by all participants at all tobacco scientific conferences is recommended. For the tobacco control community, we also recommend careful coalition building and networking with other public health groups on the ways tobacco is implicated in other public health issues.  (+info)

(19/97) Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA.

BACKGROUND: Minnesota was the first state in the USA to implement a large state funded tobacco control programme (in 1985). Despite evidence of effectiveness, it was dismantled in 1993. OBJECTIVE: To describe and analyse how and why these events transpired and identify lessons for tobacco control advocates facing similar challenges in the 21st century. DESIGN: Case study based on previously secret tobacco industry documents, news reports, research reports, official documents, and interviews with health advocates and state government officials. RESULTS: Unable to defeat funding for this campaign in 1985, the tobacco industry organised groups which eliminated it later. Despite the programme's documented effectiveness, it was dismantled based on claims of fiscal crisis. These claims were not true; the real debate was what to do with the state's surplus. Health advocates failed to challenge the claim of fiscal crisis or mobilise public support for the programme. CONCLUSIONS: Simply quoting evidence that a tobacco control programme is effective does not ensure its continuing survival. Claims of fiscal crisis are an effective cover for tobacco industry efforts to dismantle successful programmes, particularly if health advocates accept these claims and fail to mobilise political pressure to defend the programme.  (+info)

(20/97) The Duluth clean indoor air ordinance: problems and success in fighting the tobacco industry at the local level in the 21st century.

Case study methodology was used to investigate the tobacco industry's strategies to fight local tobacco control efforts in Duluth, Minn. The industry opposed the clean indoor air ordinance indirectly through allies and front groups and directly in a referendum. Health groups failed to win a strong ordinance because they framed it as a youth issue rather than a workplace issue and failed to engage the industry's economic claims. Opponents' overexploitation of weaknesses in the ordinance allowed health advocates to construct a stronger version. Health advocates should assume that the tobacco industry will oppose all local tobacco control measures indirectly, directly, or both. Clean indoor air ordinances should be framed as workplace safety issues.  (+info)

(21/97) Tobacco industry strategy to undermine tobacco control in Finland.

OBJECTIVE: To identify and explain tobacco industry strategy in undermining tobacco control measures in Finland and results of these interferences in tobacco policy development during the 1980s and early 1990s. METHODS: Tobacco industry documents, which have been publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA, were analysed. Documents were sought by Finland and by names of organisations and tobacco control activists. Documents were accessed and assessed between September 2000 and November 2002. Tactics of the tobacco industry activities were categorised as presented by Saloojee and Dagli. RESULTS: The international tobacco companies utilised similar strategies in Finland as in other industrial markets to fight tobacco control and legislation, the health advocacy movement, and litigation. These activities slowed down the development and implementation of the Tobacco Act in Finland. However, despite the extensive pressure, the industry was not able to prevent the most progressive tobacco legislation in Europe from being passed and coming into force in Finland in 1977 and in 1995. CONCLUSION: Denying the health hazards caused by tobacco-despite indisputable scientific evidence-decreased the credibility of the tobacco industry. Strategy of denial was falsely chosen, as health advocacy groups were active both in society and the parliamentary system. The strong influence of the tobacco industry may have in fact increased the visibility of tobacco control in Finland as the litigation process was also drawing attention to negative health effects of tobacco. Therefore the tobacco industry did not manage to convince public opinion. However, the tobacco industry did obtain experience in Finland in how to object to tobacco control measures.  (+info)

(22/97) Political contributions from the health and insurance industries.

During a major election year, interest surges in discovering the sources of campaign funds for influential members of Congress and presidential candidates. This study traces the contributors from the health and insurance industries during the 1990 campaign and presents preliminary figures for the 1992 campaign. Health interests contributed $16.3 million to congressional candidates in 1990, many of whom sit on influential committees and subcommittees. The insurance industry gave $10.9 million that same year. In either case, more than half of the funds came from political action committees (PACs); the rest, from individuals. As of 30 June 1992 health industry PACs had given more than $8.3 million to candidates for federal office in the 1992 campaign; insurance PACs had contributed $6.4 million.  (+info)

(23/97) Advocacy for public health: a primer.

Public health advocacy is the strategic use of news media to advance a public policy initiative, often in the face of opposition.  (+info)

(24/97) GASP: picking off the pack of lies.

GASP is celebrating 25 years tackling Big Tobacco's packs of lies!  (+info)