One potentially valuable use of cloning is to provide a source of tissues or organs for transplantation. The most important objection to this use of cloning is that a human clone would be the sort of entity that it would be seriously wrong to kill. I argue that entities of the sort that you and I essentially are do not begin to exist until around the seventh month of fetal gestation. Therefore to kill a clone prior to that would not be to kill someone like you or me but would be only to prevent one of us from existing. And even after one of us begins to exist, the objections to killing it remain comparatively weak until its psychological capacities reach a certain level of maturation. These claims support the permissibility of killing a clone during the early stages of its development in order to use its organs for transplantation. (+info)
Should we clone human beings? Cloning as a source of tissue for transplantation.
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The most publicly justifiable application of human cloning, if there is one at all, is to provide self-compatible cells or tissues for medical use, especially transplantation. Some have argued that this raises no new ethical issues above those raised by any form of embryo experimentation. I argue that this research is less morally problematic than other embryo research. Indeed, it is not merely morally permissible but morally required that we employ cloning to produce embryos or fetuses for the sake of providing cells, tissues or even organs for therapy, followed by abortion of the embryo or fetus. (+info)
Persons and their copies.
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Is cloning human beings morally wrong? The basis for the one serious objection to cloning is that, because of what a clone is, clones would have much worse lives than non-clones. I sketch a fragment of moral theory to make sense of the objection. I then outline several ways in which it might be claimed that, because of what a clone is, clones would have much worse lives than non-clones. In particular, I look at various ideas connected with autonomy. I conclude that there is no basis to the claim that, because of what a clone is, clones would have much worse lives than non-clones. I therefore reject the claim that cloning human beings is morally wrong. (+info)
Equality and selection for existence.
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It is argued that the policy of excluding from further life some human gametes and pre-embryos as "unfit" for existence is not at odds with a defensible idea of human equality. Such an idea must be compatible with the obvious fact that the "functional" value of humans differs, that their "use" to themselves and others differs. A defensible idea of human equality is instead grounded in the fact that as this functional difference is genetically determined, it is nothing which makes humans deserve or be worthy of being better or worse off. Rather, nobody is worth a better life than anyone else. This idea of equality is, however, not applicable to gametes and pre-embryos, since they are not human beings, but something out of which human beings develop. (+info)
Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled.
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Two versions of the argument that prenatal diagnosis discriminates against the disabled are distinguished and analysed. Both are shown to be inadequate, but some valid concerns about the social effects of prenatal diagnosis are highlighted. (+info)
Survey of Japanese physicians' attitudes towards the care of adult patients in persistent vegetative state.
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OBJECTIVES: Ethical issues have recently been raised regarding the appropriate care of patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS) in Japan. The purpose of our study is to study the attitudes and beliefs of Japanese physicians who have experience caring for patients in PVS. DESIGN AND SETTING: A postal questionnaire was sent to all 317 representative members of the Japan Society of Apoplexy working at university hospitals or designated teaching hospitals by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The questionnaire asked subjects what they would recommend for three hypothetical vignettes that varied with respect to a PVS patient's previous wishes and the wishes of the family. RESULTS: The response rate was 65%. In the case of a PVS patient who had no previous expressed wishes and no family, 3% of the respondents would withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) when the patient did not require any other life-sustaining treatments, 4% would discontinue ANH, and 30% would withhold antibiotics when the patient developed pneumonia. Significantly more respondents (17%) would withdraw ANH in the case of a PVS patient whose previous wishes and family agreed that all life support be discontinued. Most respondents thought that a patient's written advance directives would influence their decisions. Forty per cent of the respondents would want to have ANH stopped and 31% would not want antibiotics administered if they were in PVS. CONCLUSIONS: Japanese physicians tend not to withdraw ANH from PVS patients. Patients' written advance directives, however, would affect their decisions. (+info)
On becoming non-judgmental: some difficulties for an ethics of counselling.
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The growth in the availability of counselling services has been accompanied by growing concern about the conduct of counsellors, which in turn has led to the expressed need for an ethics of counselling. This paper will argue that there is an inherent tension between this need and the central tenets of one variety of counselling, client-centred counselling. The tension is identifiable on the basis of an inquiry into the nature of moral judgment which results in the recognition of the implicit value base in client-centred counselling. It is only when this value base is made explicit that any adequate ethics of counselling becomes a viable possibility. (+info)
The morality of abortion and the deprivation of futures.
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In an influential essay entitled Why abortion is wrong, Donald Marquis argues that killing actual persons is wrong because it unjustly deprives victims of their future; that the fetus has a future similar in morally relevant respects to the future lost by competent adult homicide victims, and that, as consequence, abortion is justifiable only in the same circumstances in which killing competent adult human beings is justifiable. The metaphysical claim implicit in the first premise, that actual persons have a future of value, is ambiguous. The Future Like Ours argument (FLO) would be valid if "future of value" were used consistently to mean either "potential future of value" or "self-represented future of value", and FLO would be sound if one or the other interpretation supported both the moral claim and the metaphysical claim, but if, as I argue, any interpretation which makes the argument valid renders it unsound, then FLO must be rejected. Its apparent strength derives from equivocation on the concept of "a future of value". (+info)